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Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive
Compensation
Robert J. Rhee*
This Article argues that employees should serve as intrafirm monitors
of executive performance and pay. Employees and shareholders, labor and
capital, can monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Diffuse,
diversified, and short durationalshareholders currently monitor performance
and pay through the market mechanism of public disclosures and share price.
Employees can add an effective layer of monitoring by leveraging private
information. Employees possess the corporation's entire information content;
the assessment derived from this content would be relevant to the board's
assessment of executive performance and pay. Corporateemployees are also a
major constituent of the corporate system and our political society. Given that
excessive pay has been linked to economic inequity, employee monitoring can
also validate executive pay in the current social, economic, and political
environment in which executive compensation and income disparities have
touched public consciousness. The basic structure of such monitoring already
exists in law, as seen in shareholdersay-on-pay mandated by the Dodd-Frank
Act. Structured properly and achieved fairly as to senior executives, a nonbinding employee vote would politically legitimize executive compensation and
income disparity at both the firm and political levels.
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INTRODUCTION

Employees are not capital investors in the corporation, and they
certainly do not have the level of standing that shareholders occupy in
corporate law or governance. 1 Does this mean that they are irrelevant
to the solution of one of the most important problems in modern
corporate governance: systemic excessive executive compensation? To
put it another way, do employees have relevant information on the
performance of the chief executive officer (CEO), and if so, how can this
information be elicited and used in an efficient manner within our
system of corporate governance? This Article posits that employees can
effectively assist the board of directors by serving as intrafirm monitors

1.
Corporation statutes generally do not focus on the rights and powers of employees in
corporate governance, at least not on the same level of shareholders. The most prominent provision
dealing specifically with employees, and senior level employees in particular, is the provision
dealing with indemnification and insurance. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2015) (providing
right to "director, officer, employee or agent"); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.56 (1969) (AM. BAR ASS'N,
amended 2010) (indemnification of "officers"); id. at § 8.57 (insurance for "director or officer"); see
also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Prog. Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) ("It is well
established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders."); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) ("This Court has held that a board of
directors is under a fiduciary duty to disclose material information when seeking shareholder
action."); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and directors.., stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.").
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of executive pay while maintaining fidelity to the core principle that the
board is the ultimate manager of the corporation's business and affairs.2
Executive pay is one of the most controversial topics in corporate
governance.' Executive compensation started to rise significantly in the
1980s, experienced explosive growth in the 1990s, and rapidly outpaced
the pay of the broader American workforce. 4 The systemic level of pay
has created wide income disparity between top executives and the
average worker. 5 The compensation problem has created a public
perception of pay uncoupled from performance 6 and a broad sense of
social inequity.7 The legitimacy and efficacy of the corporate governance
system are in question. Executive pay affects both firm efficiency and
social equity in a market society; it influences incentives, which in turn
affect production, wealth allocation, and risk selection.8 A public sense
that wages are not fairly allocated affects morale and social cohesion at
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
2.
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors..
. ."); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1969) (AM. BARASS'N, amended 2010) ("All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors .... ).
3.
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay's Impact on Directors' FiduciaryDuties, 55
ARIz. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) ("Undoubtedly, executive compensation is one of the most controversial
corporate governance issues in recent years."); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much
Deference: Behavioral CorporateFinance,CEOs, and CorporateGovernance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
673, 702 (2005) ("Executive compensation is one of the most controversial topics in corporate
governance."). The scholarship on executive compensation, referencing the phenomenon of rapid
growth and high level of compensation, is legion and too much to cite comprehensively. See infra
Section L.A (describing the different camps of thought on whether there is a problem of executive
compensation).
4.
See Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation:A New View from a
Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2099, 2099 (2010) (showing that
compensation was flat from 1940s to 1970s, but that pay became more correlated to shareholder
wealth since the 1980s); Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 300 Times More Than
Typical Workers 3 tbl. 1, ECON. POL'Y INST. (June 21, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/ topceosmake-300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growth-surpasses-market-gains-and-the-rest-ofthe-0-1-percent/ [https://perma.cc/4W5X-8QTQ] (showing historical growth of CEO pay as a
multiple of average worker pay since 1965).
See Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to
5.
the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1004, 1004 (2010) (identifying executive
compensation as one major source of the increasing income disparity seen in the last several
decades).
See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
6.
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (criticizing executive compensation
practices).
See ROBERT W. KOLB, TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH: INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE
7.
COMPENSATION 162 (2012) (arguing that "there is a growing awareness of the potential for rising
inequity to seriously corrode social cohesion").
See Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything
8.
Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1023-30 (2009) (discussing the relationship among
incentives, risk selection, and firm production).
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both firm and societal levels. 9 Prominent economists have identified
executive compensation as a "powerful force"1' o for economic inequity
and social "exploitation"1 1 of wealth allocation through the abuse of
corporate power. 12 Concentrated wealth affects both the working of the
macro economy and social welfare.' 3 Business scholars have called for a
"new paradigm" on executive compensation. 14 Given this combined
business, economic, and political reality, the current controversy over
the compensation of CEOs will not ultimately recede into a private
corner of corporate governance unless the problem is fixed.
Executive compensation has entered a new era. Until recently,
compensation was not regulated in any meaningful way. It was a
9.
See William Lazonick, Why Executive Pay Matters to Innovation and Inequity, in THE
EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 413, 415 (Cynthia
Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011) (arguing that manipulation of executive pay has resulted
in economic inequity, reduced innovation, and unstable economic performance).
10.

THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 334 (2014).

11.
The economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz provides this explanation:
In a more careful, academic way of putting it I would say that one of the explanations
of what is going on is increased exploitation. You see the ratio of wages to productivity
going way down, and that certainly is consistent with increased exploitation. And you
see that the ratio of CEO pay to worker pay has gone up. So what I would say is that
some of the explanations have to do with weakened worker bargaining power, weaker
unions, asymmetric state liberalization where capital moves but labor can't move,
corporate governance laws that provide relatively little check on abuses of corporate
power by CEOs, and an increase of monopoly power because of network externalities.
Lynn Parramore, Joseph Stiglitz on Why the Rich Are Getting Richer---and Why It Could Get Much
Worse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Stiglitz), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lynnparramore/joseph-stiglitz-on-why-th b 6354948.html [perma.cc[LC5T-TS5J].
12.
See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 334 ("[T]he extremely generous rewards meted out to top
managers can be a powerful force for divergence of the wealth distribution: if the best paid
individuals set their power salaries, (at least to some extent), the result may be greater and greater
inequity."); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY

ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 66-67 (2013) (providing an account of income inequity in the U.S. and
asserting excessive executive pay as one of the causes); Lawrence Mishel & Natalie Sabadish, CEO
Pay and the Top 1%: How Executive Compensation and Financial-SectorPay Have Fueled Income
Inequality, ECON. POL'Y INST. (May 2, 2012) (arguing that executive compensation and financialsector pay have caused income inequity).
13. The credit rating agency, Standard & Poor's, has warned of the serious consequences of
income inequity, which has been factored into bottom line projection of economic growth. See Joe
Maguire, How Increasing Inequity Is Dampening U.S. Economic Growth, and Possible Ways to
Change the Tide, GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.globalcreditportal.com/
ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleld=135 1366&SctArtId=255732&from=CM&nsl-code=LME
&sourceObjectld=8741033&sourceRevld=l&fee ind=N&exp-date=20240804-19:41:13 [perma.cc/
7AT2-FEC8]:
At extreme levels, income inequality can harm sustained economic growth over long
periods. The U.S. is approaching that threshold. Standard & Poor's sees extreme income
inequality as a drag on long-run economic growth. We've reduced our 10-year U.S.
growth forecast to a 2.5% rate. We expected 2.8% five years ago.
14. See Jay W. Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem: Time for a New Paradigmfor
Executive Compensation,in THE FUTURE OF BOARDS: MEETING THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 77 (2012).
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matter of private contracting between the board and the executive. The
Dodd-Frank Act now mandates voting on executive pay of public
companies. 15 Since this reform measure is fairly new, its efficacy
remains to be seen. 16 Irrespective of whether most voting outcomes
approve proposed pay packages-the short but predictable experience
thus far-say-on-pay is normatively desirable because shareholders
now have a legal right to participate in the compensation decision. Their
opinion is relevant to the board's deliberation, and relevant information
facilitates informed decision-making.1 7 Shareholder monitoring may
prove to have long-term salutary effects.
Yet even as the ink is drying on the Dodd-Frank Act, the limits
of shareholder monitoring are well known. Many shareholders in
modern capital markets are rationally disengaged from corporate
governance because they are diffuse and diversified and many have
short-term investment horizons.1 8 Furthermore, shareholders are only
one of many contractual constituents of the firm. 19 One conception of a
firm is a "nexus of contracts" among various factors of production.20 This
nexus includes not only top-level officers and the board, but also nonexecutive managers and rank and file employees who contribute to the
production function of the firm. 21 Employees possess the firm's entire

15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
16. See generally Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a
Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213 (2012)
[hereinafter Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay] (analyzing empirical data regarding voting
trends); Randall S. Thomas et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank:An Empirical
Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967 (2013) [hereinafter Thomas et al., First
Year] (providing preliminary empirical data on voting results).
17. See Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 638-44,
642 n.78 (2000) (suggesting that the duty of care encompasses a "duty to be informed" and citing,
among other cases, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) and Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995)).
18. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-400 (1986) (discussing the problem
of the rationally apathetic shareholder); Edward S. Adams, Bridgingthe Gap Between Ownership
and Control, 34 J. CORP. L. 409, 422 (2009) (same); Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto,
88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1300 (2013) (same).
19. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 384, 390-91 (1937) (asserting that
a firm is a set of contractual arrangements among various factors of production); see also STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 33-35 (2008)
(explaining the nexus of contracts model of the corporation and identifying the various contractual
constituents of the firm); Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) ("There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex
relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material
and capital inputs and the consumers of output.").
20. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 310-11.
21. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (discussing how organization of firms contributes
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information. 22 Shareholders cannot claim the same; they depend on the
capital market, which only incorporates publicly-disclosed information
23
into the stock price.
This Article advances the idea that a corporation and its board
can use employees as intrafirm monitors of executive performance and
pay. The advisory votes of shareholders and employees can provide an
important and different source of information to the board. Two distinct
benefits inure from granting employees the right to participate in pay
decisions. First, from a microeconomic perspective of the firm,
employees have a significant incentive to monitor the company and
possess private information relevant to the performance of the company
and its senior executives. Second, from a political economic perspective,
employees can legitimize executive compensation in the public
discourse; this aspect is important because executive compensation is
no longer a purely private matter. One significant factor in growing
economic inequity is high executive pay. 24 The political and economic
advantages of permitting employee voice in executive compensation are
significant. 25 With respect to implementation, the basic framework
already exists in law today in the U.S. and globally, which is
26
shareholder say-on-pay voting.
The idea presented in this Article may be viewed as
controversial since corporate governance as practiced today revolves
around the triad of the board, management, and shareholder. The board
27
ultimately manages the business and affairs of the corporation.
Corporate law grants shareholders the right to vote and a say on
to the production function); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 262 (1999) (diagramming the hierarchical structure of firms).
22.

See PHILLIP PHAN, TAKING BACK THE BOARDROOM: THRIVING AS A 21ST-CENTURY

DIRECTOR 3 (2007) ("There is increasing realization that a firm is a place where people meet to
exchange specific information for the purpose of engaging in production.").
23.
See infra Section III.A (discussing hypotheses of market efficiency).
24.

See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 334; STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 66-67. See generally

Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
1 (2013).
25.
See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 4 (1999) (noting that
workers want more of a say and voice at the workplace); ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 76-105 (1970) (analyzing

the economic relationship between participatory voice and loyalty); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,
PromotingEmployee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 765, 767 (2011) (suggesting that there is "under-representation of employee voice in the
American economy").
26.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012) (requiring shareholder approval of executive
compensation no less frequently than once every three years); see also infra Section I.C (describing
the international dimension of the say-on-pay laws).
27.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1969) (AM. BAR

ASS'N, amended 2010).
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compensation under the Dodd-Frank Act. Management has a close
working relationship with the board that is generally, if not passively,
supported by shareholders. 28 Employees have virtually no formal role
in the internal affairs under U.S. corporate law. 29 The tension between
our understanding of traditional corporate governance and the proposal
advanced in this Article is more apparent than actual. The actual
proposal, granting employees the right to have a say on pay, is
consistent with one of the most fundamental tenets of corporate
30
governance-informed decision-making by the board.
To frame the analysis that follows, a few prefatory comments are
warranted. This Article is about institutional design. It is not written
to advance a broader agenda of expanding the employee's role in
American corporate governance or comingling labor and corporate law,
which are discrete fields. 31 The idea here is not based on a normative
28. See infra Section I.D (providing empirical data on say-on-pay voting); see also Aditi
Bagchi, Who Should Talk? What Counts as Employee Voice and Who Stands to Gain, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 869, 875 (2011) (noting that shareholders can benefit if they "withdraw from their
asymmetrical love affair with grossly overcompensated management").
29.

See MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARK J. ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2

(1999) ("Labor directly influences corporate governance structures in the United States less than
it does . . . in some other countries."); Harry W. Arthurs & Claire Mumm6, From Governance to
PoliticalEconomy: Insights from a Study of Relations Between Corporationsand Workers, in THE
EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 350 (Cynthia

Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011) ("The presumption is that workers will not participate in
the making of important decisions, including many which directly and dramatically affect their
interests."); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 767 ("In the American model of corporate governance,
the shareholders and management are perpetually allied, leaving labor to fend for its interests
largely through individual bargaining."); see also BLAIR & ROE, supra, at 163-313 (discussing the
German and Japanese models); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 811-20 (same). See generally
BLAIR & ROE, supra (analyzing employees' role in corporate governance); GREGORY K. DOW,
GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2003) (same); MICHAEL
LOWER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2010)

(same). In Europe, employees have a greater role in corporate governance.
30. Informed decisionmaking is the core of a board's fiduciary duty of care. See Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985).
31. Corporation law and labor law are separate fields with traditionally recognized
boundaries. See Bagchi, supra note 28, at 869 (noting the "barriers between labor law and
corporate law"); Richard Mitchell et al., Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersections
Between CorporateGovernance, CorporateLaw and Labor Law, 23 WISC. INT'LL.J. 417, 417 (2005).
However, scholars from both fields have sought to explore a greater role for employees in formal
corporate governance. See generally Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25; Henry Hansmann, Worker
Participationand Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589 (1993); Sanford M. Jacoby,
Employee Representation and Corporate Governance: A Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
449 (2001); Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (2011); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets
Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 334 (2008); Mitchell et al., supra. There
are critics of such efforts; see also generally Bagchi, supra note 28; Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of
Employee Ownership:Some Unintended Consequencesof CorporateLaw and Labor Law, 10 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 305 (2008); Scott A. Moss, Yes, Labor Markets Are Flawed-But So Is the
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judgment that broad employee participation in corporate governance
should be an end. One should read this proposal from the perspective of
corporate governance and law. The method is instrumental, advancing
the use of an existing governance device to better monitor senior
executives-a basic function of corporate governance. The starting
premise of this Article is that there is a problem arising from failed
arm's length bargaining between the board and the CEO, which is now
the well-articulated Bebchuk-Fried thesis 32 and has been broadly
accepted. 33 This Article does not rehash the debate on whether there is
or is not a real problem with executive compensation. 34 There is a welldeveloped body of literature on the subject, and the literature on the
problem of executive compensation is legion, which itself suggests that
there are many commentators who believe there is a problem. From the
orientation that there is in fact a problem of excessive pay, this Article
explores the institutional design of intrafirm monitoring of executive
pay and performance.
This Article proceeds in four sections. Section I provides brief
background information on say-on-pay and identifies problems and
limitations of shareholder voting. Section II proposes the concept of
employee monitoring and describes the scheme's structure and
implementation. Section III identifies the benefits of employee
monitoring, and Section IV discusses potential objections.
I. SHAREHOLDER SAY
A. The Problem of Executive Pay
For much of the twentieth century, CEOs were paid well relative
to other corporate workers, but, according to some prominent business
scholars, they were paid on par with senior "bureaucrats."35 Scholars
Economic Case for Mandating Employee Voice in Corporate Governance, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 959
(2011).

32. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 23-44.
33. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board
Capture, Optimal Contracting,and Officers'FiduciaryDuties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 847-48 (2011)
(noting that "the belief that the American executive compensation system works well is a distinctly
minority position"); see also Posner, supra note 8, at 1014 ("The problem of executive compensation
").
is not only real; it is more serious than I believed it to be ....
34. See infra Section L.A and notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
35. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARV. Bus. REV. (May-June 1990), https:/thbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-howmuch-you-pay-but-how [perma.ccJUKQ9-UWN3]; see Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
PerformancePay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 262 (1990) (hypothesizing
that market and political forces impose constraints that reduce performance incentives). However,
even Jensen and Murphy have recently recognized that executive compensation schemes today are
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suggested that contracts should be optimized to reduce agency cost,
thereby justifying greater compensation as incentive for superior
company performance.3 6 In the 1990s, CEO pay experienced rapid
growth and compensation levels have since remained at high levels
relative to worker pay. 37 This growth has leveled off in the past several
years, but what remains after the "big bang" in executive compensation
is a new status quo in which top corporate executives are routinely paid
wages that are several hundred times the pay of average workers.
Numerous studies have chronicled the rapid rise of executive
compensation. 38 The following data on the level of executive pay and its
relation to worker pay are from one such study (salary figures are
adjusted to 2014 dollars). 39

Year

1965
1973
1978
1989
1995
2000
2007
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

CEO Compensation Nonsupervisory
Worker
(incl. realized
Compensation
options)

832,000
1,087,000
1,487,000
2,769,000
5,862,000
20,384,000
18,786,000
10,575,000
12,662,000
12,863,000
14,998,000
15,711,000
16,316,000

40,200
47,200
48,000
45,400
46,000
48,700
51,100
53,200
53,700
53,000
52,600
52,800
53,200

Ratio of CEO-toNonsupervisory
NsWorker
Compensation

20.7
23.0
31.0
61.0
127.4
418.6
367.6
198.8
235.8
242.7
285.1
297.6
306.7

S&P 500
Index

Dow Jones
Index

579
512
320
596
836
1,962
1,687
1,046
1,238
1,334
1,422
1,671
1,931

5,986
4,401
2,735
4,628
6,941
14,744
15,048
9,808
11,585
12,584
13,371
15,255
16,778

seriously flawed. Kevin J. Murphy & Michael C. Jensen, CEO Bonus Plans:And How to Fix Them,
2011),
12-022,
Paper
Working
Unit
NOM
School
Business
(Harvard
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935654 [perma.cc/J5WM-F5EZ].
36. See Murphy & Jensen, supra note 35, at 27-28 (discussing the use of "inappropriate
performance measures" in setting executive compensation).
37. See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 66-67.
38. Id. at 296 n.12, 309 n.88 (providing citations to other sources and data).
39. Mishel & Davis, supra note 4, at 3 tbl. 1. Other studies and sources have shown slightly
different numbers, but all show the same general trend and levels of high ratios of CEO pay. See,
e.g., Lorsch & Khurana, supra note 14, at 79 (showing ratio of average CEO pay to average worker
pay growing from 44:1 in 1980 to 344:1 in 2007).
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According to this study, the ratio of CEO to worker compensation
accelerated from 1978 to 2014. In 1973, the ratio of CEO to worker pay
was 23:1, but by 2014 it had ballooned to 306:1. Based on the above
data, calculations of the annual growth rate from the period 1965 to
40
2014 are the following:
"
"
"
"

CEO pay
Worker pay
S&P 500
Dow Jones

6.3%
0.6%
2.5%
2.1%.

CEO pay increased annually at a rate 11 times greater than
worker pay. Furthermore, CEO pay outpaced the annual growth rate of
the broader market indices by 2.5 to 3.0 times. This suggests that CEOs
are paid at rate increases that are much greater than the increased
value of the companies they are managing. We cannot explain executive
pay by marginal productivity gains attributable to actions of senior
41
executives.
Executive pay packages were previously matters of internal
corporate governance and private contracting-a closed world of boards,
executives, and their advisers. As pay packages have rapidly increased
in the past several decades and manipulations of compensation have
been exposed, compensation has become a controversial public issue.
40.
This is simply internal rate of return calculations for the forty-nine years, from 1965 to
2014: future value (FV) = present value (PV) x (1 + R)T where R is the annual rate of return and T
is time. Under this calculation, for example, a 6.3% return yields: $832,000 x 1.06349= $16,316,000.
Any slight differences in the calculations are due to rounding of the growth rate to the tenth of a
percent.
41.
See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 334:
The most convincing proof of the failure of corporate governance and of the absence of
a rational productivity justification for extremely high executive pay is that when we
collect data about individual firms (which we can do for publicly owned corporations in
all the rich countries), it is very difficult to explain the observed variations in terms of
firm performance.;
STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 21:
It strains credulity to think that over the intervening years CEOs as a group have
increased their productivity so much, relative to the average worker, that a multiple of
more than 200 could be justified. Indeed, the available data on the success of U.S.
companies provide no support for such a view.;
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y
283 (2005) (concluding that the ratio of aggregate pay of the top five executives to the firm's
earnings grew from 5% in 1993-1995 to about 10% in 2001-2003 and that this growth is beyond
the increase that could be explained by firm size, industry classification, or company performance);
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without
PrincipalsAre, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 901 (2001) (finding that CEO pay in fact responds as much to
"a lucky dollar as to a general dollar" where luck is defined as factors of firm performance that are
outside of the CEO's control).
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Perhaps the most infamous episodes involved the outsized pay package
of a former president of the Walt Disney Company for essentially
several months of ineffective work, 42 and the "retention bonuses" for
Wall Street investment bankers even as they were responsible for
causing great economic damage to their firms and the global economy. 43
A recent study shows that many corporations pay their CEOs more than
they pay in federal income taxes. 44 There is evidence that even payout
policy on dividends and stock buybacks, a basic corporate financial
decision, has been improperly affected by consideration of the CEO's
45
wealth.
Such episodes epitomize conspicuous compensation in an era of
high economic inequity. 46 Although most issues of corporate governance
42. See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) ("In December
1996, only fourteen months after he commenced employment, [Michael] Ovitz was terminated
without cause, resulting in a severance payout to Ovitz valued at approximately $130 million.").
This litigation was widely followed in the media. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Big Pay Packages
May Fade After Ruling on Ex-President of Disney, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/8110/business/medialbig-pay-packages-may-fade-after-ruling-onexpresident-of-disney.html? _r=0 [perma.cc/6X6P-HJFP].
43. See Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. PlanningHuge Bonuses After $170 Billion
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at Al. The banks were so embarrassed to call the payouts
"performance bonus" that they were instead called "retention bonus." STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at
79.
44.
ScoTT KLINGER & SARAH ANDERSON, FLEECING UNCLE SAM: A GROWING NUMBER OF
CORPORATIONS SPEND MORE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION THAN FEDERAL INCOME TAXES,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 1 (2014),

http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IPS-Fleecing-Uncle-SamReport
-Nov20l4.pdf [perma.cc/DG8H-AR88]. The report finds that seven of the top thirty American
corporations paid their CEOs more than they paid federal income taxes, and that twenty-nine of
the hundred highest-paid CEOs received more in pay than their company paid in federal income
taxes. Id. at 1.
45. See Philipp Geiler & Luc Renneboog, Executive Remuneration and the Payout Decision
23 (European Corp. Governance Inst. - Fin. Working Paper No. 420/2014, 2014), http://ssrn.comI
abstract=2436343 [perma.ccI4MPE-K9J3] (discussing the effects of compensation manipulation on
payout policy); Lazonick, supra note 9, at 424-37 (discussing the use of stock buybacks to
manipulate compensation). Cash dividends reduce stock price. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 406-07 (1lth ed. 2014) (showing how cash dividends reduce

stock price). On the other hand, stock buybacks tend to increase share price. See ASWATH
DAMODARAN, CORPORATE FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 687 (2d ed. 2001) ("A stock buyback

reduces the number of shares outstanding and is often accompanied by a stock price increase."). If
executive compensation were tied to stock price alone without a thoughtful contract or beard
analysis of performance, then executives would have incentive to manipulate stock price through
payout policy.
46. See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 334 (providing evidence of wealth inequity); Forget the
1%: It Is the 0.01% Who Are Really Getting Ahead in America, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21631129-it-001 -who-are-really-gettingahead-america-forget-1 [perma.cc/7RNS-SV4Z] (same); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman,
Wealth Inequity in the United States Since 1913. Evidence from CapitalizedIncome Tax Data (Ctr.
for Econ. Policy Research Discussion Paper No. DP10227, 2014), http://ssrn.comlabstract=
2526356 [perma.cc/C9CY-C7R5] (same).
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involve technical and arcane legal rules applied by an insular group of
boards, the corporate bar, and mostly Delaware courts, the issue of
executive compensation has become a public issue. 47 Corporate
governance crises beget public awareness, as was the case in the 1990s
and early 2000s resulting in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the financial
crisis of 2008-2009 resulting in the Dodd-Frank Act. 48 Presently,
executive compensation is squarely in the realm of public discourse.
There are two broad camps of thought on the current state of
executive compensation. The first is the "optimal contracting" camp,
which has argued that contracting for compensation works well and
that the levels of compensation seen are the product of market pricing
for executive talent. 49 The second is the "board capture" camp, which
has argued that contracting has been undermined by failure of the
board to monitor CEO performance and compensation. After a deluge
of academic analyses, a general consensus has been reached that there
is a problem with executive compensation.5 0 The optimal contracting
camp occupies a distinct minority position today. 5' This Article
therefore accepts the premise of the prevailing view.
There is substantial evidence that the average board and CEO
do not bargain at arm's length for compensation, and that CEOs have
significant power and influence over the level of his or her own

47.
See, e.g., Robert Frank, Another Widening Gap: The Haves vs. the Have-Mores, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2014, at BU4; Steven Rattner, Opinion, Inequality, Unbelievably, Gets Worse, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014, at A25.
48.
See Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2013)
(arguing that public scrutiny of corporate governance arises when the ordinary private ordering of
corporate governance fails and that "[d]ecisions about governance move from Wall Street to Main
Street" as a result).
49.
See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
23 (2008) ('The specific executive compensation arrangements that we actually observe, however,
simply reflect the result of a bargaining process between shareholders' elected representatives and
managers."); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO CompensationInefficient Pay Without Performance?,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1159-60 (2005) (espousing "optimal contracting theory, which posits that
contracts are designed to maximize shareholder value net of contracting costs and transactions
costs"). Some commentators have even suggested that compensation levels in some cases may be
too low. See Steven Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5, 6 (2008) ("It is
possible that good CEOs are not overpaid, but underpaid.").
50.
See Sorapop Kiatpongsan & Michael I. Norton, How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A
Universal Desirefor More Equal Pay, 9 PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 587, 588 (2014)
(showing that most people, regardless of nationality, share similar beliefs on executive
compensation and that their estimates are much lower than the actual amounts executives make);
see also Gretchen Gavett, CEOs Get Paid Too Much, According to Pretty Much Everyone, HARV.
BuS. REV. (Sept. 23, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014109/ceos-get-paid-too-much-according-to-prettymuch-everyone-in-the-world/ [perma.cc/3U3X-WXRU] (providing a summary of Kiatpongsan and
Norton's paper).
51.
Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, at 847-48.
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compensation. 52 The most powerful advocates of this critique have been
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. 53 Due to managerial power and
position, CEOs collect large economic rents. 54 In a pre-Dodd-Frank era,
Bebchuk and Fried argued that both shareholders and the market have
limited influence to curb excessive pay.5 5 Their criticism has proved
durable even in a post-Dodd-Frank era of shareholder say-on-pay.
However, the premise of this Article goes beyond shareholdercentrism. 56 Advocates of shareholder primacy do not connect the role of
executive compensation to the broader problem of economic inequity.
Their concern is the maximization of shareholder wealth. 57 Presumably
much of the criticism of the "board capture" camp would go silent if the
current compensation levels were strongly connected to shareholder
wealth. For example, one can argue that executives can be paid up to
the point at which marginal corporate wealth gain equals marginal
salary increase. But such an analysis may prove to be too simplistic
because it does not answer the question of distribution of corporate
wealth as among shareholders, executives, and employees. The
connection between executive pay and income inequity should be
recognized because this aspect of corporate governance imposes broad
externalities beyond senior executives and shareholders. 58 There is also

52. See BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 6, at 23-44, 61-86.
53. Id.
54. See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 65 ("One of the interpretations ... is that... corporate
managers seized a larger share of the 'rents' associated with corporations."); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 783 (2002) ('Managers with power are able to
extract "rents"-value in excess of that which they would receive under optimal contracting-and
managers with more power can extract more rents."). Economic rent is derived "from the strategic
advantage that ...management possesses in the distribution of the returns to monopoly power."
Oliver E. Williamson, ManagerialDiscretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032,
1035 (1963).
55. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 45-58.
56. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of ShareholderFranchise,93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, ShareholderFranchise](arguing that shareholder power to control
corporate democracy is exaggerated, and may in fact not even exist); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
Shareholder Power] (advocating for an increase in shareholders' abilities to intervene and affect
corporate governance arrangements).
57. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (noting that "shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law" has become
a dominant orthodox value).
58. See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 334 ("[T]he extremely generous rewards meted out to top
managers can be a powerful force for divergence of the wealth distribution" with the likely results
being "greater and greater inequality."); STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 66-67 (describing how the
shift in U.S. corporate governance laws since the mid-1970s has allowed managers to "entrench
and protect their interests ... to take a larger share of the corporate rents for themselves with
impunity.").
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a larger question of social equity. The distribution of the gains currently
results in excessively large allocations to a small handful of senior
executives even though production in a corporation is always a
collective endeavor utilizing many factors of production, including
employees.5 9
With that said, shareholder primacy and social equity may not
be binary choices. The most efficient outcome for shareholders may be
60
lower compensation levels for senior executives on the whole.
Shareholders may get the same performance for less pay, in which case
shareholders would gain. Less systemic rent extraction would result in
lower aggregate pay levels. Shareholders and employees may agree
upon this outcome. Since shareholders comprise a much broader
spectrum of society than the class of senior executives, this outcome
would tend to make income and wealth distributions more equitable
across the corporation and society.
B. Limits of Delaware CorporationLaw
When discussing a failure of an aspect of corporate governance,
some may consider the font of reform to lie in state corporate law.6 1 This
thought is more hopeful than real.6 2 There are impediments to any
serious reform through state corporate law.
First is the problem of politics and money. Delaware reigns
supreme in corporate law, particularly for public corporations-where
the problem of compensation is most acute. 63 Delaware law is regarded

59.
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 21, at 779-81 ('With team production it is difficult,
solely by observing total output, to either define or determine each individual's contribution to this
output of the cooperating inputs."); Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 287-319 (providing an analysis
of the team production model as a better "basis for understanding the unique economic and legal
functions served by the public corporation" than alternative theories).
60. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 1-7, 9-10 (criticizing the aggregate dollar values
of compensation).
61. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay'sImpact on Directors'Fiduciary
Duties,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2013) (focusing on negative say-on-pay votes as a basis for fiduciary
obligations of boards and the importance of state-based enforcement mechanisms); Thomas &
Wells, supra note 33, at 847-48 (focusing on Delaware courts' recent increased scrutiny of the
fiduciary duty of officers in the contracting process); Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting the
CorporateWaste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in ControllingExcessive
Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 117-19 (2010) (contrasting the historical
reluctance of Delaware courts in applying the corporate waste doctrine, with the doctrine's recent
perceived resurgence).
62. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 45-46 ("[J]udicial review has failed to impose
any meaningful constraint[s] on executive pay.").
63. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (providing statistical evidence that over half of all public
companies that incorporate in the United States incorporate in Delaware).
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as a kind of a quasi-national corporate law, and its judiciary enjoys the
well-earned reputation as preeminent corporate jurists. 64 This expertise
is a competitive advantage for the state and generates significant
revenue. 65 Since meaningful reform of excessive compensation would
most likely result in a systemic decrease in compensation, any
semblance of real reform in Delaware would be exposed to the real risk
of a "compensation run" to other jurisdictions by those holding the
decision-making power. Management will want to avoid jurisdictions
that actively scrutinize the grant of compensation. There would be
literally millions of reasons to forsake Delaware. Knowing this, both the
Delaware legislature and courts will not take action that would
66
seriously compromise the state's franchise.
With this perspective in mind, Delaware courts have applied the
traditional doctrines of fiduciary duty, the business judgment rule, and
corporate waste to review compensation in disputed cases. 67 This
framework gives a board virtually unfettered discretion to award
whatever compensation it decides, 68 absent culpable conduct arising
from disloyalty, bad faith, bad process, faulty disclosure, waste, or

64. See generally Randy J. Holland, Delaware'sBusiness Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34
J. CORP. L. 771 (2009) (detailing the deference and authority afforded to the Delaware courts in
modern business law).
65. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 130-37 (2009)
[hereinafter Roe, Shrinking Half-Life] (discussing revenue generated for Delaware through
incorporation in the state); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2497-99
(2005) [hereinafter Roe, Politics] ("Delaware's freedom to act and its limits are not determined
solely ...by its strength vis-A-vis other states, but by the line demarcating where the federal
authorities leave it alone and where they do not.").
66. On the occasion when the Delaware courts took action that was deemed significantly
against the interests of corporate management, the legislature took immediate action to
legislatively overrule the court. Of course, this is exemplified by the famous episode of Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and the subsequent enactment of the exculpation provision
in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). See Robert J. Rhee, FiduciaryExemption for Public
Necessity: ShareholderProfit, Public Good, and the Hobson's Choice During a National Crisis, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 682-83 (2010) ('The decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom resulted in the
enactment of DGCL section 102(b)(7).").
67. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, at 865-80 (describing the history and methods of
Delaware courts evaluating excessive compensation claims).
68. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 70-75 (Del. 2006)
(upholding severance payout of $130 million to a fired executive because it did not constitute
waste); Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *3-4, *7-10 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 2012) (ruling a severance package worth $40 million given to a fired executive did not
meet the waste standard, even though defendant was under no contractual obligation to pay the
executive any severance); In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 5215-VCG,
2011 WL 4826104, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (holding that compensation levels at Goldman
Sachs and the potential risks they posed could only support a conclusion that the directors made
"poor business decisions" and thus were within the scope of the business judgment rule).
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outright fraud. 69 As long as the board makes an informed, good faith
decision and does not mislead shareholders in doing so, its decision is
effectively bulletproof. Any amount, no matter how gross or excessive,
would be proper under corporate law, 70 subject only to the theoretical
limit of the corporate waste doctrine. 71 Based on this legal framework,
courts have predictably dismissed derivative suits based on negative
shareholder say-on-pay votes in the vast majority of cases. 72
In the past three decades, as executive compensation has
increased conspicuously and as courts have been forced to decide highly
controversial cases like the Disney litigation, 73 what have judges done
about the problem? No new doctrines have been developed to address
the issue. 74 Although there were some instances in which courts
threatened higher scrutiny, they have since returned to managerial
deference as public dissatisfaction has subsided. 75 As commentators
noted, shareholders occasionally succeeded in cases "at some stage of
the litigation process." 76 This qualifier is important because what really
matters for changing behavior and, more importantly, outcomes is a
finding of liability or the imposition of a cost. The mere threat of liability
is not credible enough unless there is also a real possibility of liability
under the theory of excessive compensation. 77 There has been no case
69.
State corporation law is most effective as a check on executive compensation when there
has been fraud or major defects in disclosure. See, e.g., Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433 (Del. Ch.
2008) (denying corporate defendant's motion to dismiss because shareholder plaintiff sufficiently
pled claims of improper disclosure and corporate waste in relation to stock option manipulation);
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying corporate defendant's motion to dismiss
because shareholder plaintiff rebutted business judgment rule deference through claims of
defendant's fraudulent concealment of wrongdoing).
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 35 (upholding severance
70.
compensation worth $130 million paid to fired executive for fourteen months of ineffective work).
71.
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Irrationality is the outer limit of
the business judgment rule" and "the functional equivalent of the waste test."). Waste occurs "only
in the rare, 'unconscionable case where [a board] irrationally squander[s] . . .corporate assets.' "
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263). As such,
the exception for finding executorial liability absent evidence of "conflict of interest or improper
motivation" has been described as "theoretical." Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049,
1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996).
72.
See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 23-25 (describing the role of say on pay suits in current
derivative litigation, and noting that such suits are "dismissed at the pleading stage with
overwhelming frequency").
73. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27.
74.
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, at 880 (noting that the weakness of the waste
doctrine and the "lack of any alternative, practicable approach" to scrutinizing executive
compensation has hampered courts).
75.
See id. at 879-80.
76. Id.
77. See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1154 (2013) ('The ultimate source of the expressive value of judicial
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where a court struck down a compensation decision solely based on the
78
excessiveness of the pay.
Courts justify shying away from interfering with the substantive
terms of the employment contract between the corporation and the
CEO, if the contract is the product of actual arms-length bargaining, by
using longstanding doctrine. Judicial meddling in specific contract
terms-such as the amount of compensation-would be frowned upon.
Courts can certainly apply their own judgment on the matter, 79 but this
contravenes long-existing pillars of corporation law of giving boards
deference when they act in an informed manner and on a good faith
basis.8 0 The board has the authority to decide the business and affairs
of the corporation.8 ' This authority necessitates the business judgment
rule, which is a socially useful rule limiting the liability for officers and
directors.8 2 Good, bad, or ugly, corporate governance under current
3
standards is stuck with the decisions of boards.8
Thinking within the framework of existing corporate law,
commentators have suggested a potential check on self-interested
negotiation for compensation could be the fiduciary duty of corporate
officers.8 4 However, there are reasons to be less sanguine about the
efficacy of this route to reform. As a contracting counterparty to the
corporation, executives are entitled to pursue their self-interested
economic goals. One cannot realistically expect an executive to bargain
with herself to the detriment of her own self-interest. Fiduciary duty
opinions is derived solely from the power to assess liability (i.e., a consultant in a black robe is still
just a consultant).").
78. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, at 880 ("[Courts] have been hampered, at least in
part, by the waste doctrine and its inherent weaknesses, and by lack of any alternative, practicable
approach to scrutinizing compensation."). However, when board action fits within traditional
theories of misconduct, such as faulty disclosure or waste, courts have acted in the compensation
arena. See supranote 69; infra note 102.
79. See Rhee, supra note 77, at 1152 ("Despite frequent assertions, scholars have been
rightfully skeptical of the argument that courts lack the technical competence to review business
decisions.").
80. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (the business judgment rule "is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors ... acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company").
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 141(a) (2015); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1969) (AM. BAR
ASS'N, amended 2010).
82. See Rhee, supra note 77, at 1140 (noting that rules limiting the liability of shareholders
and directors are two pillars of corporation law).
83. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
("[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational,' provides no
ground for director liability ...").
84. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, 848--49 (citing Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695,
708-09 (Del. 2009) ("[Clourts have a stronger doctrine they can employ.., to monitor abuses in
executive compensation: the fiduciary duties of officers.").
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cannot go so far as to suggest that employees and agents should be
charities to the firm or that they have a duty to ignore their primary
economic interest of vigorously bargaining their wage or stake.8 5 Even
before the explicit recognition of an officer's fiduciary duty in Delaware,
the common assumption was that officers were fiduciaries, and so the
rise in executive compensation proceeded with this understanding. 8 6
Furthermore, public companies are required to have independent board
members on their compensation committees.8 7 In theory, at least, board
independence should achieve an outcome largely similar to officers
contracting under the halo of fiduciary duty.
Courts are also not incapable of developing new doctrines to
address new business climates on fairly short notice. Delaware courts
rapidly developed new doctrines to confront the realities of the takeover
and leveraged buyout eras of the 1980s and 1990s.88 In executive
compensation, however, there have been no similar judicial innovations
to design a review system tailored to the specific problem at hand.8 9
This has not been for lack of good test cases able to serve as vehicles for
judicial action. For example, the Delaware court openly acknowledged
that the circumstances in Disney did not display the model corporate

85. Analogously, courts have stated that partners owe a fiduciary duty that is "[n]ot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928). But partnership law also makes clear that a partner's conduct does not violate
fiduciary duty "merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest." REVISED
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(e) (AM. BAR ASS'N & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1997).
86.
See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 708-09 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,361 (Del. 1993)) ("In the past, we have implied
that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and
that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors.").
87. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 952(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900-01 (2010) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15
U.S.C. §78); see NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(a),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMToolsfbookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanua-3&
manual=/lcm/sections/lcm-sections/ [perma.cc/PS6Z-L8DS] (last visited Jan. 10, 2016) (amended
by NYSE-2012-49 (Jan. 11, 2013)) ("Listed companies must have a compensation committee
composed entirely of independent directors.").
88. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43-48 (Del. 1993)
(applying an enhanced level of judicial scrutiny to board decisions when sale of control was
implicated); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179-82 (Del. 1986)
(determining directorial fiduciary duties in the context of a cash buyout); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957-59 (Del. 1985) (determining the applicable scrutiny for reviewing
management's defensive measures in the context of a takeover situation).
89. Some commentators have proposed modifications to Delaware's laws of fiduciary duty
and judicial review. See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 48-50 (arguing for Delaware courts to utilize
say on pay votes to alter the standard used when examining questions of executive compensation);
Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, at 880-97 (advocating for judicial recognition of officers' fiduciary
duties and increased scrutiny of actions implicating those duties to allow courts to discipline
excessive compensation).
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governance structure; 90 yet bad facts such as those in Disney91 were
insufficient to construct a new doctrine specific to governance failure in
compensation.
Doctrinal innovations are possible, but their lack of existence is
a juridical choice. As a state supreme court, the Delaware Supreme
Court could set forth a bright-line rule on a presumption of validity. For
illustrative purposes, consider a rule where a ratio of more than 100:1
between the CEO's compensation and the lowest paid employee's
compensation would be scrutinized under a higher standard such as the
entire fairness standard. 92 Such bright-line standards are more
common in the legislative process, but there are prominent examples
from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence of judicially-set quantitative
limits. 9 3 Or consider the possibility of announcing an intermediate
scrutiny for severance pay or golden parachutes based on a multifactor
reasonableness standard, such as the benefit to the corporation, the
corporation's ability to attract executive talent, the length of tenure, the
quality of past service, and other relevant facts. 94 These cursory
examples are suggested to show merely that there may be not-absurd
90. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 906 A.2d 27, 56-57 (Del. 2006) (observing
that the compensation committee's decision-making process fell short of best practices).
See id. at 35-36 (upholding severance compensation of $130 million for fourteen months
91.
of work by a former company president, despite trial evidence showing he was ineffective and that
the decision to hire him was flawed).
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("Under the entire
92.
fairness standard of judicial review, the defendant directors must establish to the court's
satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price." (citing Nixon
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ('The entire fairness analysis essentially requires
'judicial scrutiny.' "); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ('The concept of
fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price."))).
93. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality
of Michigan Law School's "narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions" and stating that
"[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
425 (2003) ("Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate ... few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.., will satisfy
due process.").
94. Under the common law process of corporation law, a court could condition the application
of the business judgment rule on meeting strict judicial conditions. See, e.g., In re MFW S'holder
Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013). This case involved a controlling shareholder who initiated a
going private transaction, and conditioned the deal upon approval by an independent committee
and a majority-of-the-minority shareholder vote. The court provided the standard of review and
the necessary conditions:
The business judgment rule is only invoked if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the
transaction on the approval of both a special committee and a majority of the minority
stockholders; (ii) the special committee is independent; (iii) the special committee is empowered
to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the special committee meets its
duty of care; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion ofthe minority.
Id. at 535.
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possibilities in which a thoughtful common law process could
experiment and fashion rules of law sufficiently malleable to the
particular social problem at hand if a court had the desire to go down
95
this road.
If Delaware wanted to do something about the problem, it could
have done so and it has had recurring opportunities to restructure the
framework of fiduciary duty, business judgment rule, and corporate
waste. 96 But it is unlikely that Delaware will ever take leadership of the
issue. One need not be a Delaware naysayer 97 to believe that Delaware
courts are not inclined to exercise judicial power to reform executive
compensation on a national level in a way that could potentially risk
the prestige and economics of the state's corporation law franchise.
Without state legislative mandate, the erection of new doctrinal
frameworks to address executive compensation is a step too far for the
Delaware corporate bench.98 Courts would have to go outside their
95.
Much of Delaware corporate law, though statute originated, is developed through the
common law process. See id. at 528 (recognizing the common law approach of Delaware corporation
law); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2005) ("Delaware corporate law may be the last vestige of the 19th
century common law style in America."); E. Norman Veasey with Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What
Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governancefrom 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some
Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) ("Delaware's common law process, which
places case law at the forefront of corporate law, is the functional equivalent of judicial
legislation.").
96.
See supra note 68.
97.
See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 696-705 (1974) (arguing that federal standards of responsibility be enacted in
corporation law to offset the Delaware-led "race to the bottom" by the states). The question of
whether corporation law is engaged in a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top" has spawned a
vigorous debate. Compare id. at 665-66 (explaining the "race to the bottom" argument in the
context of states' loosening of corporation law to attract and retain businesses away from other
states), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256-58 (1977) [hereinafter Winter, Jr., Theory of the
Corporation](arguing that other states changing their corporation laws to compete with Delaware
for tax revenue indicates a "race to the top" designed for companies to maximize capital), and
Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 127, 128-30 (1982) [hereinafter Winter, Private Goals] (explaining that, "[a]s long
as ... there is real competition to make money through attracting corporate charters, Delaware
will not tilt toward management" and is thus engaged in a "race to the top").
98.
In contrast, Delaware courts have created new doctrines, including different standards
of review, to address other kinds of problems in corporation law-including in the takeover arena.
See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-59 (Del. 1985) (creating and
applying an intermediate, two-part standard to review a board's defensive action against a hostile
acquirer); see also William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form:A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1291-94
(2001) (explaining how the Delaware courts developed new doctrines "because the new forms of
merger transactions and board responses to unsolicited takeover bids ... demand[ed] more flexible
judicial tools specifically adapted" to address the "dynamic revolution in corporate merger activity"
facing the courts).
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comfort zone and familiar doctrinal habits; they would also have to
envision, or to acknowledge openly, a regulatory function of corporate
law, which would run counter to the conventional refrain that corporate
law is enabling. 99 As the Delaware chancery court stated, "[t]he decision
as to how much compensation is appropriate to retain and incentivize
employees, both individually and in the aggregate, is a core function of
a board of directors exercising its business judgment." 100 State
corporate law is designed to give maximum authority and discretion to
informed, non-bad faith decisions on the amount of the pay. 10 1
Delaware courts are not a serious solution to the problem of excessive
pay. 10 2 This conclusion is an unremarkable observation of the current
limits of state corporate law. The politics of revenue-generative
lawmaking business, the legitimacy of longstanding foundational
doctrines, and the tension between judicial inertia and activism when
stare decisis confronts new social problems limit corporate common
law's effectiveness in this area.
C. ShareholderSay-on-Pay
Compensation regulation must be prescribed by legislation. This
understanding gave rise to the say-on-pay phenomenon, which is a
fairly new concept. 10 3 The idea originated in the U.K., where say-on-pay
was enacted in 2002.104 Other countries with advanced economies soon
followed. Australia and the Netherlands enacted laws in 2004, Sweden

99. See Shintom Co., Ltd. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005) ("The Delaware
General Corporation Law is an enabling statute ....
"); William T. Allen, Contracts and
Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) ("United States
corporate law is thus chiefly enabling in character, not regulatory.").
100. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *14
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
101. See Lisa R. Stark, Delaware Insider: Do Stockholders Have a "Say on Pay" in Delaware?
Lessons from Recent Executive Compensation Decisions, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2012, at 1, 3
("Stockholders seeking to challenge compensation decisions made by disinterested and informed
directors have an uphill battle in Delaware.").
102. There are the occasional rulings that seem to acknowledge the problem of executive
compensation. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 33, at 879-80 ("[Cjourts, even Delaware's allegedly
promanagement courts, have at times been willing to impose... higher scrutiny for executive
compensation."); see, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.
Ch. 2009) (denying defendant corporation's motion to dismiss a claim of waste relating to the
compensation package granted to retiring CEO during the subprime lending market depression at
the pleading stage). However, these cases work within the traditional framework of the corporate
waste doctrine, which is an exceedingly difficult standard to meet. See supra note 71.
103. For a history, see Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1217-36.
104. Id. at 1226.
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in 2006, and Norway in 2007.105 The rapid adoption of say-on-pay in
other advanced economies indicates a global perception of a problem in
executive compensation.
In the U.S., nascent efforts to influence the board's discretion in
compensation came in the form of shareholder proxy proposals. 0 6 But
these efforts were sporadic and depended on shareholder initiative.
Say-on-pay first became a federal regulatory requirement in 2008 and
2009, when financial firms receiving TARP funds were required to
institute shareholder say-on-pay. 10 7 During this time, another high
profile executive compensation episode captured the public's attention.
While the financial markets were collapsing and the American public
was suffering through the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression,1 08 Wall Street investment bankers and executives received
enormous "retention" bonuses. 10 9 The decoupling of pay and
performance on Wall Street was complete in this case. Since state laws
were insufficient to address these problems, the federal government
intervened.' 10
With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the mandate of sayon-pay was extended broadly to all U.S. public companies."' The
statute requires that companies allow a shareholder vote to approve
executive compensation packages at least every 3 years.1 12 It also
mandates votes on both the frequency of the vote and golden parachute

105. Id. at 1227. See Jan Lieder & Philipp Fischer, The Say-on-Pay Movement-Evidence from
a ComparativePerspective, 8 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 376, 381-87, 392-98 (2011) (discussing
say-on-pay in Europe).
106. The first shareholder say-on-pay proxy proposals were submitted under Rule 14a-8 in
2006. Thomas et al., Dodd Frank's Say on Pay, supra note 16, at 1217. By 2009, say-on-pay
proposals were the largest category of shareholder proxy proposals and regularly achieved
majority shareholder support. Id. at 1217-18.
107. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2012); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 111(e), 123 Stat. 115, 519 (2009).
About 280 financial firms that received TARP funds were required to hold say-on-pay votes.
Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay, supra note 16, at 1223.
108. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES 83-402 (2011) (detailing the history of the financial crisis).
109. See Andrews & Baker, supra note 43.
110. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600-32 (2003) (arguing
that the federal government intervenes in corporate governance when it perceives failures or
inadequacies in state corporation laws); see also Mark J. Roe, A Spatial Representation of
Delaware-WashingtonInteractionin CorporateLawmaking, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 553 (2012).
111. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1218.
112. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012)). The disclosure
of executive compensation is provided in 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2015).
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payments in a merger or acquisition. 113 In spite of management
recommendations for triennial votes, shareholders of most companies
have voted to hold say-on-pay votes annually.1 1 4 Shareholder votes
apply to the compensation packages of the top five executive officers
named in the proxy compensation disclosure.1 15 The vote is a straight
"for" or "against" the overall compensation package and does not
provide for line-item voting.1 6 The vote is advisory and not binding on
the board.1 17 Say-on-pay does not create or imply any change to the
18
fiduciary duties of the board or create any additional fiduciary duties. 1
The authority to approve compensation packages still rests squarely
with the board.
The Dodd-Frank Act strengthened the board's independence
from the influence of insider executives regarding pay decisions because
the board must consider the advice of shareholders. Public companies
must have independent board members on its compensation
committee. 11 9 Relevant factors in determining independence are the
and whether a director is affiliated
source of compensation of a director,
20
affiliates.
its
or
with the company
The Dodd-Frank Act also recognizes the political and socioeconomic dimensions of relative pay and income inequity. It requires
disclosure of the median of the annual total compensation of all
employees (excluding the CEO), the annual total compensation of the
CEO, and the ratio of the two figures.1 2' Since CEO pay is already
required to be disclosed, the important disclosure is the median
employee pay. The ratio succinctly communicates pay differential. This
increased disclosure is required in any annual report, proxy or
information statement, or registration statement that requires

113. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-l(a)(2), (b).
114. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1249.
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011).
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c).
118. Id.
119. See supra note 87.
120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900-03 (2010); see N.Y.S.E supra note 87, at § 303A.02(a)(ii) (providing the
test of independence as "all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a
relationship to the listed company which is material to that director's ability to be independent
from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member").
121. Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b). The SEC adopted the rule for pay ratio disclosure. Pay Ratio
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9877, 34-75610, 17 C.F.R. Pts. 229, 249, at 1-2 (effective
date Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/rules/fina1/2015133-9877.pdf [perma.cc/ET5F-DVGL]
[hereinafter Pay Ratio Disclosure].
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executive compensation disclosure. 122 The wage ratio disclosure is a
legislative nod to the concerns of employees and the public.
The pay ratio disclosure may result in several benefits. Shaming
may temper the most pecuniary appetites, though there is the distinct
possibility that millions of more dollars may ultimately outweigh the
cost of these negative feelings. CEOs may also feel pressure from the
public disclosure. Although CEOs are public figures, many would prefer
to avoid notoriety in the eyes of the public. An eye-catching disparity in
pay may depress employee morale and elicit disapproval, which are
relevant to the production function of the company. Boards might also
be sensitive to these kinds of pressures. These combined effects may
influence pay practices at the margins. The pay ratio disclosure could
be a small step toward greater equity in compensation.
D. Limits of ShareholderMonitoring
Even before the widespread implementation of the Dodd-Frank
Act, commentators were skeptical of the effectiveness of shareholder
voting to curb excessive executive compensation after examining prior
experience abroad. 123 Recent empirical studies have generally
supported this prediction.1 24 According to one study, shareholders
strongly supported management resolutions on pay. 125 Votes in favor
averaged 91.2% for all companies. 126 Only 37 companies failed to receive
majority support. 27 These negative votes stemmed from shareholder
discontent arising from a perceived disconnect between pay and
company performance.1 28 Overall, shareholder votes were highly
correlated with share price returns and the amount of CEO pay:
122. The SEC recently issued proposed rules on implementing Section 953(b). Pay Ratio
Disclosure, supra note 121, at 15-25.
123. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay" CautionaryNotes on the U.K Experience and the
Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 341 (2009) (noting that in the U.K.
shareholders approved compensation packages in many thousands of votes with only eight
negative votes over a six-year period).
124. See generally Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay, supra note 16 (providing
preliminary empirical data on voting results); Thomas et al., First Year, supra note 16 (same).
125. In the 2011 proxy season, about 2,220 U.S. public companies held shareholder votes on
executive compensation. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay, supra note 16, at 1248.
126. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1248, report similar results
from other empirical studies. See Michael Littenberg, Farzad Damania & Justin Neidig, A Closer
Look at Negative Say-on-Pay Votes During the 2011 Proxy Season, DIRECTOR NOTES (Conference
Bd.), July 2011, at 2 (noting that only 36 companies, or 1.6%, of 2225 companies in the Russell
3000 that held votes rejected management compensation resolutions). About 71% of companies
received more than 90% shareholder vote, 23% received 70-90% vote, and 6% received 50-70%
vote. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supranote 16, at 1250.
127. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1251.
128. Id.
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Shareholders favored high share returns and low CEO pay, and disliked
low share returns and high pay; and their voting patterns reflected
these preferences. 129 Shareholders did not necessarily follow the
recommendations of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a proxy
advisory firm. 130 While all 37 negative votes followed the negative
recommendations of ISS, the firm recommended negative votes for 285
13
total companies, 13% of the companies it reviewed. '
In light of the pattern of positive votes, "the voting gesture
mandated by law might have been mostly empty."1 32 However, the legal
right to a voice on the issue may have changed the dialogue dynamic
between shareholders and management. 133 In a few cases, management
has been responsive to some aspects of shareholder concern. 134 These
marginal effects of shareholder voting-generally the limit of
shareholder efficacy in monitoring-are not surprising. Commentators
have previously predicted that say-on-pay would be ineffective because
shareholders will not engage in individualized analysis and monitoring
of executive compensation.1 35 Preliminary data seem to support, in the
main, these earlier critiques.

129. Id. at 1249. Given these preferences, shareholders tended to vote no more in a situation
where share price declined but the CEO was highly paid. Id.
130. ISS provides proxy services to shareholders for a fee, and provides proxy voting
recommendations. See INST. S'HOLDER SERVS. INC. http://www.issgovernance.com (last visited Jan.
20, 2016) [perma.ccI25DN-HJSU].
Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1255; see John Helyar, After
131. Thomas et al.,
Much Hoopla, Investor 'Say on Pay'Is a Bust, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 20, 2011, at 23
(reporting that ISS advised shareholders to vote no on 293 companies, but only 32 companies
actually received negative votes). However, ISS still had some influence. In another study,
Thomas, Palmiter and Cotter report that when ISS recommended "for" votes, shareholders voted
in favor on average 92.6% with no proposals being voted down. When ISS recommended "against"
votes, shareholders voted in favor 64.4%, with 31 failed votes out of 173 "against"
recommendations. Thomas et al., First Year, supra note 16, at 983; see Kang, supra note 18, at
1334:
The fact that shareholders might rely on a heuristic voting cue from the endorsement
of proxy advisors is utterly unsurprising. Voters in similar large-scale electorates
regularly rely on heuristic cue-taking from credible agents who are perceived to have
the same values and can be reasonably trusted to offer the recommendations that the
voter would have reached with the investment of time and thought.
132. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1265.
133. Id.; see Thomas et al., First Year, supra note 16, at 1002-10 (providing four case studies
of the dialogue between shareholders and management resulting from shareholder votes on
executive compensation).
134. See Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1265; see also Thomas et
al., First Year, supra note 16, at 1002-10. Some empirical studies have suggested that say-on-pay
has not changed the amount of compensation, but instead it changed the mix of cash and incentive
pay. See Natasha Burns & Kristina Minnick, Does Say-on-Pay Matter? Evidence from Say-on-Pay
Proposalsin the United States, 48 FIN. REV. 233, 246-51 (2013) (using examples from the U.K.).
135. See Gordon, supra note 123, at 341.
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The problem with shareholder say-on-pay is the well-recognized
observation of rational shareholder apathy. 136 "Often the aggregate cost
to shareholders of informing themselves of potential corporate actions,
independently assessing the wisdom of such actions, and casting their
votes will greatly exceed the expected or actual benefits garnered from
informed voting."137 Apathy toward monitoring is rational from an
individual cost-benefit perspective. The problem is one of collective
action. 13 8 It is exacerbated when diffuse shareholders hold diversified
portfolios, 139 and when the turnover on the typical investment is
relatively short, even for long-term shareholders. 140 The profile of the
shareholder with the most incentive to monitor corporate governance is
the long-term, activist, or undiversified shareholder. However, such
shareholders are not ubiquitous in a modern, liquid equity market in
which diversification is said to be a good thing. 141 Lastly, as the efficient
market hypothesis suggests, many shareholders rely on market prices
to incorporate all public information, which further diminishes the
incentive to monitor investments at the individual holding level.1 42
Evidence from both the U.K. and the U.S. supports the
hypothesis of shareholder apathy in voting. 14 3 Most shareholders vote
in favor of management's compensation the majority of the time. For a
company that has not disappointed shareholders with lower returns or
incited their discontent with excessively high executive compensation

136. See CLARK, supranote 18, at 390-400 (discussing the problem of the rationally apathetic
shareholder).
137. Id. at 390-91.
138. Id. at 391-92. Given the typical shareholder's minority holding, shareholders do not have
an incentive to incur the significant cost of active monitoring, which would yield insufficient return
to the shareholder given the cost.
139. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952) (advancing portfolio
theory of stock investment).
140. See Mark Roe, Are Stock Markets Really Becoming More Short Term?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentarylhas-short-termism-instock-markets-increased-by-mark-roe (the average hold period for longterm investors like Fidelity
and Vanguard was a year and a half in 2010).
141. See Markowitz, supra note 139, at 77 (showing that diversification can be a normatively
good investment strategy).
142. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 327 ("The evidence on efficient markets has
convinced many professional and individual investors to give up pursuit of superior performance.
They simply 'buy the index,' which maximizes diversification and cuts costs to the bone."); see also
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988).
143.

See KYM MAREE SHEEHAN, THE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: GREED,

ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAY ON PAY 145-59 (2012) (discussing the limits of institutional investors as
effective monitors of executive pay).
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for poor performance,1 44 the default vote would likely be in favor of the
a
compensation package. Even when a proxy advisory firm issues 145
negative recommendation, shareholders mostly disregard the advice.
A contrary interpretation of the preliminary data is that
shareholders are fully engaged in monitoring compensation, and in the
vast majority of cases voted in favor of compensation packages after
informed consideration. Empirical data on voting outcomes do not
reveal the thought processes of the many thousands of voting
shareholders. One wonders whether shareholders examined the record
and made individualized informed decisions for companies in their
diversified portfolios. 146 The conclusion to be inferred from mostly
positive votes is important. A hypothesis of shareholder informed
decision-making would be far-reaching. It implies that there has not
been a real problem of executive compensation at all, and that informed
shareholders agree with most pay packages; the many critiques of
executive compensation would therefore be simply much ado about
nothing, since they do not reflect the concerns of most shareholders.
However, this inference from the data has not been demonstrated to be
true, 147 and most scholars have not advanced it.
Even institutional shareholders are not immune from apathy
because as highly diversified, active traders in a liquid equity market,
the cost-benefit analysis of active involvement is acute. Although proxy
advisers could ameliorate the collective action problem, 148 the
14 9 If
preliminary empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case.
say-on-pay is limited in its efficacy, it reflects the fact that shareholders
are limited in their capability to effectively monitor. 150 Shareholders are
limited to market information, primarily share price returns and
publicly disclosed financial results, explaining the relationship between
the level of voting support and share price. There is a need for more

144. See Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1249 (reporting that "low
returns and high CEO pay result[ed] in lower say-on-pay support").
145. See id. at 1265 ("ISS may be less influential than commonly thought on this type of
proposal.").
146. See Kang, supra note 18, at 1313 ("At least for such public companies with dispersed
ownership, it is highly unlikely that the multiplicity of shareholders will remain well informed
about the company's affairs and then achieve collective agreement on the best course of action for
their company.").
147. See supranotes 50-51 and accompanying text.
148. See Gordon, supra note 123, at 351-52.
149. See Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank'sSay on Pay, supra note 16, at 1213 (noting that "the net
effect of a negative ISS recommendation on the overall shareholder vote is relatively small at most
companies").
150. See Adams, supra note 18, at 422 (noting that "shareholders have historically been of
little importance in monitoring corporate conduct" due to "the collective action problem").
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than just the efforts of

II. INTRAFIRM MONITORING

A. Employee Advisory Vote
In light of the known limitations of shareholder say-on-pay, this
Article proposes the utility of additional monitors of pay. Employees can
serve as intrafirm monitors of executive compensation, and the means
to do this have already been considered and implemented into law. 15 1
The structure can mirror the Dodd-Frank Act's mandate of shareholder
say-on-pay. At least once every 3 years, a public U.S. corporation
should hold an employee vote to approve the compensation of top
executives. 152 Unison of voting between shareholders and employees
should not be required, as long as employees have periodic
opportunities to vote and convey information to the board. However, it
would be ideal if shareholders and employees voted in tandem. Most
shareholder votes occur annually, and so employee votes should follow
the same schedule.
Shareholder say-on-pay is an advisory vote, not binding on the
board. 153 The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the shareholder vote
cannot be construed: "(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or
board of directors; (2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary
duties of such issuer or board of directors; (3) to create or imply any
additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors." 154 This
provision recognizes that, under state corporate law, the board has the
ultimate authority to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, including setting compensation. The same limitation
should also apply to employee voting.
Employee voting could be further limited by conditioning it on a
wage-ratio trigger. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the disclosure of the
wage ratio between the CEO and employees. 155 Employee say-on-pay
could be structured to trigger upon the company exceeding a certain
151. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 802 (suggesting an "alliance between capital and
labor in monitoring management" and that this "lack of the appearance of this alliance in
American corporate governance is an important cause of our problem with excessive management
compensation").
152. Cf. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (instituting similar provisions).
153. Id.
154.

Id.

155. Dodd-Frank Act § 953. The SEC has announced proposed rules on wage ratio disclosure.
See Pay Ratio Disclosure, supra note 121.
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level of wage ratio. However, there is an efficiency consideration. The
concept of say-on-pay is a response to excessive compensation. A certain
level of wage ratio could be deemed presumptively not excessive when
compared to the baseline of the median employee pay. For example, if
the compensation ratio is 20:1-a quaint level in light of the modern
trend in compensation--one would question whether a say-on-pay vote
by either shareholders or employees is really necessary.
Certain intuitions can guide us. A trigger of 20:1 would most
likely be deemed too low, and would take executive compensation back
to the 1960s and 1970s.15 6 A trigger of 100:1 would probably be too high
because this level is in the neighborhood of current levels that have
caused public and political rebuke. 157 Some compromise in the range
between 50:1 and 100:1 seems intuitively appropriate (but, of course,
these would be matters of legislative determination). This range
permits high salary, but one suspects that neither employees nor the
public would be so outraged by this sort of level. Any rent extraction
that may occur would be fairly marginal, and properly deemed
158
insignificant in light of the cost of monitoring.
A concrete example illustrates the point. Suppose the median
employee pay at a corporation is $50,000.159 At a trigger range of 75:1,
CEO pay could be $3.75 million without triggering employee say-onpay. Based on current pay levels of CEOs today, the majority of public
companies-most of which are, by definition, small to medium
capitalization companies-may not be required to hold employee
votes. 160 Since the size of CEO pay is highly correlated with the size of
156. To be clear, the suggestion that it is "too low" refers to the necessary political
compromises that have to take place to enact legislation. By way of comparison, the Japanese ratio
of CEO to average employee pay is approximately 16:1. Jason Clenfield, In Japan, Underpaidand
Loving
It,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(July
1,
2010),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186014341924.htm
[https://perma.cc/
RGE9-PTFG].
157. See supra note 39 and accompanying table.
158. See Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation 20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 165, 2010) ("Moreover, 'awarding' pay by allowing managers to
extract some rents can be optimal if monitoring is costly."), http:/lwww.nber.org/papers/
w16585.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A9K-TR5A].
159. See id. at 41 (providing average nonsupervisory worker compensation). Some companies
pay their employees high compensation. See, e.g., Brett Philbin, Average Goldman Pay: $399,506,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2013) (noting the average pay at Goldman Sachs in 2012),
http://www.wsj.comlarticles/SB10001424127887323968304578245482333171010
[https://perma.cc/38SG-PUQG]; Gus Lubin, Google Has the Highest Average Salaries in the Tech
Industry: $141,000, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 10, 2011) (noting the average pay at Google in 2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-really-is-the-best-tech-company-to-work-for-20 11-6
[https://perma.cc/X5HT-R89B].
160. In 2011, the median total realized compensation of CEOs in the Russell 2000 was $1.84
million. 2012 PreliminaryPay Survey: Two Consecutive Years of Double-Digit Pay Increases, GMI
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the corporation, 161 the compensation packages for the largest companies
162
would more likely be subject to employee say-on-pay.
Additionally, the idea of a wage trigger can be applied to
shareholder say-on-pay as a tweak of the Dodd-Frank reform.
Shareholder voting, one can argue, would be unnecessary if the wage
ratio between the CEO and employees did not exceed a certain level.
This reform of say-on-pay could have efficiency benefits. One strongly
suspects that in light of the correlation between firm size and pay, a
significant portion of smaller companies, 63 perhaps even a majority,
would be exempt from holding say-on-pay votes with a reasonable
trigger, and that many larger companies would still be subject to
shareholder vote. One hastens to add that if the idea is appealing in the
abstract, the difficulty in practice would be to identify the trigger level.
A trigger in the range between 50:1 to 100:1 seems plausible as a
political compromise of the legislative process.
B. Weighed Voting
The idea of employee voting requires a further analysis of how
voting should be implemented. Of course, there is a fundamental
difference between political voting and voting in corporations.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of shareholder democracy, 164 a

RATINGS 3 (2012), http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/downloadget/file/1102561686275128/GMIRatingsPrelimPaySurvey20l2 052012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BCV-HGPQ] (based on a
sample size of 1349 companies).
161. See id. at 2 (showing significant pay differences among CEOs in the S&P Smallcaps,
Midcaps, and 500 indices, with 2011 median total realized compensations of $2.57 million, $4.74
million, and $8.79 million, respectively).
162. See id. at 4 (showing a median total realized compensation of $11.9 million in 2012 for
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies); Gretchen Morgenson, The Unstoppable Climb in C.E.O. Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2013, at BU1 (noting that the top 100 CEOs were paid a median
compensation of $14 million in 2012).
163. The SEC provided an exemption from say-on-pay to smaller companies with less than
$75 million in public float until January 20, 2013. Shareholder Approval of Executive
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011).
Smaller reporting companies must now hold say-on-pay votes.
164. Shareholder democracy is frequently used as shorthand for shareholder participation
through voting in corporate governance. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439
(Del. 1971) (referring to the principle of shareholder voting as "corporate democracy"); Hoschett v.
TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen, C.) (noting that voting and
deliberation aspects of shareholders' annual meeting resembles democratic discourse); Bebchuk,
ShareholderPower,supra note 56, at 842-43 (suggesting that shareholder democracy will enhance
shareholder value); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 55 (2008) (suggesting a link between shareholder democracy and
corporate and executive accountability).
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corporation is not a platonic political entity.1 65 It is an economic
organization. There is no liberty interest in the right to governance.
There is not even a property or vested contract interest in the rights
stated in stock. 166 The political principles of universal suffrage and "one
person, one vote"'167 do not apply for obvious reasons.1 68 Shareholder
voting is based on shares owned, 169 and shareholder classes of unequal
1 70
rights are permissible.
71
Voting rights in corporations serve an economic purpose.
Unlike shareholders, employees and creditors typically do not vote on

165. See Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 45-46 (noting that "the model of democratic forms should not
too strictly be applied to the economic institution of a business corporation (where for instance
votes are weighted by the size of the voter's investment)"); see also Tom C.W. Lin, CEOs and
Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1398 (2014) (suggesting that "[clorporations are not
democratic nation-states" and that wholesale attempts to "democratize" them can cause serious
harms).
166. See Fed. United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940):
Consequently, in a case where a merger of corporations is permitted by the law and is
accomplished in accordance with the law, the holder of cumulative preference stock as
to which dividends have accumulated may not insist that his right to the dividends is a
fixed contractual right in the nature of a debt, in that sense vested and, therefore,
secure against attack.... On the contrary, his contract has informed him that the right
is defeasible; and with that knowledge the stock was acquired.;
id. at 339; see also Bove v. Cmty. Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 96 (R.I. 1969) (holding that "any
subsequent legislation enacted pursuant to [a corporation statute's reservation clause], even
though it may amend the contract's original terms, will not impair its obligation in the
constitutional sense").
167. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (recognizing a "citizen's right to a vote free
of arbitrary impairment by state action ... when such impairment result[s] from dilution").
168. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129,
158-59 (2009) (discussing voting a matter of shares held and the quantities of votes entitled in
each share). On the other hand, the default rule of partnership provides for a "one partner, one
vote." See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(0 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997)

("Each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business.").
169. See CLARK, supra note 18, at 390 ("We could argue further that voting rights should be
proportional to one's share of the residual interest in the firm."). This is not the case in other
business organizations such as partnerships. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401() ("Each partner has
equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business."). More generally,
inequality and inequity are separate concepts in corporation law. See Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc.,
812 A.2d 880, 886 (Del. 2002) (noting that "equity and equality are not synonymous concepts in
the Delaware General Corporation Law"); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("It
is well established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated equally for
all purposes.").
170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 151(a) (2015) (permitting different preference rights and
classes of stock). Companies like Google, Berkshire Hathaway, and Ford Motor have different
classes of common stock with different voting rights.
171. See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 63-89 (1996) (explaining the importance of voting rights of equity capital);
Thompson & Edelman, supra note 168, at 130 (arguing that shareholder voting right is a means
of error correction).
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important governance matters. 17 2 These observations raise a question
of how the voting scheme should be structured. This Article proposes
that every employee should have a vote, but that vote allocation should
be unequal. Vote allocation should be a function of the potential
effectiveness of different classes of employees as monitors of executive
performance.
Even the lowest ranking employee of a large public company
may have some sense of how the company is doing. But their
understanding of CEO performance would not compare to the senior
manager of a business unit within a corporation. Consider a low level
worker at a large corporation with a market capitalization of $10 billion.
How will the lowest rank and file employee, who may earn $25,000 per
year for a low skill job, feel about the CEO earning $10 million, a ratio
of 400:1? Would the employee's likely visceral reaction to the income
disparity be relevant? These kinds of anticipated personal reactions at
the firm level should not be factors in determining executive
compensation. The best way to control for this is through weighed
voting.
The allocation of voting rights should be based on employee
titles, functions, and job descriptions. Employee say-on-pay must
principally serve a monitoring role. 17 3 This function requires informed
voting, which communicates relevant information to the board. In
rational corporate hierarchies, the quantity and quality of information
held is fairly correlated to position in the corporate hierarchy.
Companies should have discretion to allocate votes, subject to a
prohibition against gaming. Gaming is achieved by allocating the most
voting power to the highest level of executive management, since this
level would most favor executive pay proposals. 174 There is a balance
between calibrated voting and gamed outcomes. This balance can be
achieved either through the use of qualitative standards, or through
17 5
bright-line quantitative rules.
For example, a proportion that allocates 10% of the vote to the
non-managerial rank and file employees, who constitute 90% of the
172. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.21(a) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS'N, amended 2010) ("Only
shares are entitled to vote."); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 221 (2015) (permitting debt instruments
to have voting rights). Absent unusual circumstances, however, it would be odd for debt
instruments to have voting rights. Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 732-38 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.).
173. See Adams, supra note 18, at 442 (noting that full-circle evaluations promote "efficiency
and profitability").
174. See infra Section II.C (discussing the possibilities of gamed outcomes and the means to
prevent them).
175. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
557-623 (1992) (analyzing the difference between rules and standards and their best application).
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corporation's workforce, might not be an unreasonable mix. This
allotment is a significant but nonetheless minority voting power. The
visceral reaction of the average employee against a relatively high CEO
pay, if that is the fear, would not overwhelm the voting outcome. At the
same time, knowing what average employees think about their CEO's
pay is still relevant information for the board. Issues like morale,
happiness, job satisfaction, commitment to the firm, social cohesion,
and sense of common undertaking (if not common lot) are important to
the business; and they are relevant factors in the corporation's
production function. A small but meaningful allocation can serve a role
in providing a mix of information. Each company should be allowed to
calibrate voting such that there can be meaningful participation.
The class of voters with the greatest individual voting power
should be the managerial ranks-the ranks below the highest executive
level subject to Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
compensation reporting requirements. For definitional clarity, "senior
and middle managers" hereafter refers to all other officers, executives,
and managers outside of the top "senior executive officers," such as the
CEO and the CFO. Below the senior executive officers, there is a
significant class of senior managers who manage large business units
or functions. They possess the best information on the performance of
the CEO and the company's prospects, but they are most likely to be
biased in favor of the CEO. These competing tensions balance such that
they have the greatest individual voting power, but not class voting
power. Class voting power is limited by the pyramidal organizational
structure where more senior ranks are fewer in number.
There are compelling reasons to argue that the class of voters
176
with the greatest voice should be the senior and middle managers,
the layers below the top five senior executive officers whose pay
packages are subject to vote. 177 This group is large in most significant
corporate enterprises. They connect the shop floor with the executive
suite. They have management responsibilities, tasked with executing
the strategies given down from above. They have broad organizational
awareness, and a good sense of connecting corporate strategy with
tactical understanding. They dream of climbing higher in the corporate
hierarchy, high enough to earn the keys to the executive suites; yet they
are not so far removed from the bottom tier to have lost a sense of
economic proportion. They report directly to senior executive officers,
and the managerial rank exchanges vital information. They are in
176. "Midlevel management knows how well the company is functioning on a daily basis and
which parts of the company's structure needs additional work." Adams, supra note 18, at 432.
177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2012).
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routine contact with outside constituencies such as suppliers and
customers. They are important inputs for gauging morale, and for
influencing broader rank and file morale.
Senior and middle managers collectively know much about the
state of the corporation, its trajectory, and the cause and effect of
corporate leadership on firm performance, and in many cases they
collectively know more than their individual superiors. Many or most
have invested significant human capital in long careers at the company.
They are professionally, economically, and personally vested in the
success of the corporation; and while they can exit their professional
investments at any given time, such exit is not as frictionless as the
available exit of public shareholders. Their commitments are longer
term and less diversified; thus they have a significant personal stake in
the performance of the corporation. They are the leaders in the trenches
of the firm. Their collective opinions should not be underestimated even
at the rarified board level, though as a practical matter it is difficult for
boards to get direct information from them.
While the non-managerial employee who earns $25,000 in a lowskill position may not be an informed voter in important respects, the
same cannot be said for the $250,000 non-executive vice president
responsible for a market segment, a product, or client base. Such a
person would have significant information on the state of the company,
how the senior executives are managing it, and ultimately the
performance of the CEO. Furthermore, the class of vice presidents on
the same level would hold a substantial quantity and quality of the
firm's total information.
Based on the foregoing reasons, a stylized example of a voting
allocation might look something like this: 10% to the general workforce,
60% to middle and senior nonexecutive managers, and 30% to other
executive officers. In most companies with a pyramid organizational
structure, the general workforce would, by definition, constitute most
of the employees. Conceptually, the voting allocation should be a
reverse pyramid. In this allocation scheme, 90% of the voting power is
allocated to the small minority in the managerial ranks. The proposal
here is not based on some vague or misguided notion of corporate
egalitarianism. It is a proposal designed to elicit information from all
employees but mostly from a broader managerial rank than the board
normally works with in performing its monitoring function. Lastly, I
note that there is no "correct" proportion in some deductive sense, but
a range of reasonable voting allocations that credibly serve the principal
function.
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C. Gamed Voting
Whenever there is consequential voting, there lurks a potential
problem of gaming. There are two kinds of gaming problems in the
proposed allocation scheme. The first is where management allocates
votes in such a way as to stack the deck in favor of the CEO. This is
structural gaming-the senior management (whose compensation is
subject to vote) manipulates the structure of the scheme to rig the
outcome. The second is internal gaming where the employee's internal
self-interested motivations affect the voting. These gaming effects are
related.
Confidentiality in voting is important since retaliation can be a
real risk in employment contexts, 178 particularly in the senior ranks. An
employee may rationally fear that confidentiality is not assured.
Ordinary employees would have less to fear. Would a CEO fire some
random assembly line worker in a far-flung operation due to a negative
vote (assuming that such a vote was even traceable)? However, such
fear would be more grounded in reality for the senior and managerial
ranks, but these employees are also important sources of information.
Confidentiality can be breached through deductive analysis of
voting outcomes if voting allocation is structurally gamed. While it
would be impossible for anyone to know how a specific low-level
employee voted based on voting results, deductive analysis can reveal
the votes or voting patterns of employees with significant voting power.
Simple numeric examples illustrate the relationship between
confidentiality, gamed voting, and probabilistic inference. Suppose
there are four classes of employees below the top executives whose
compensations are subject to board approval and public disclosure. The
corporate hierarchy has four levels outside of the top senior executive
officers: class A is the senior executives, class B senior nonexecutive
managers, class C middle managers, and class D the general workforce.
The class voting allocations are: 20% (A), 28% (B), 30% (C), and 22%
(D). Each class has the following number of employees and votes.

178. See Adams, supra note 18, at 431, 437 (stressing the importance of anonymity in fullcircle evaluations where subordinates are evaluating supervisors); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
& Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1537, 1570-71 (2007) (discussing the importance of confidentiality in employment and
whistleblower contexts); Benjamin 1. Sachs, EnablingEmployee Choice: A StructuralApproach to
the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 706-12 (2010) (discussing the need for
confidentiality and secrecy in union organizing).
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Employee
Class

Number of
Employees

Votes per
Individual

Individual
Voting Power

Votes per
Class

Class Voting
Power

A
B
C
D

1
2
5
11

10
7
3
1

20%
14%
6%
2%

10
14
15
11

20%
28%
30%
22%

Total

19

na

na

50

100%

Suppose the compensation package was voted down with thirty
"against" votes, which totaled 60% of all votes. It is impossible to know
how the lower level employees voted, and from the CEO's perspective,
she may not care as much. The CEO works most closely with the
executives and senior managers-the three employees in classes A and
B. Since these three hold twenty-four votes, it is a mathematical
certainty that at least one of them voted "against." Also, it is unlikely
that only one voted "against." If the class A employee voted "against"
(ten votes), then the remaining twenty "against" votes must have come
from the collective twenty-six votes held at classes C and D, which is
perhaps an unlikely 77% majority of the lower two classes. If the one
negative vote was from a class B employee (seven votes), then the
remaining 23 "against" votes must have come from the 26 votes at
classes C and D, which is a highly unlikely 88% majority of the lower
two classes. These outcomes are plausible, but in varying degrees of
probability unlikely absent special reasons why a large segment of one
class or another would caste negative votes. A CEO can be confident
that the most likely possibility is that two of the three employees in
classes A and B-those employees who are the closest to her-voted
"against." If the CEO had other information as well-for example, past
dealings, personal relationships, and emotional intuitions-the
identities of the "against" voters could be fairly obvious. By voting
"against," these employees could harm their career prospects. A CEO
who correctly perceives that a majority of her management team does
not have confidence in her can easily solve the problem by replacing
them. Thus, under this voting structure, higher-class employees would
have incentive to internally game the vote irrespective of their opinions
on the company's prospects and the CEO's performance.
Such deductive reasoning quickly loses efficacy when the voting
permutations increase due to greater number of voters and decreased
concentration of voting powers. As the saying goes, there is safety in
numbers: probability theory says that increasing the number of voters
would obscure voting identity.

2016]

INTRAFIRM MONITORING

Consider a more complex organization with the identical voting
allocations by employee rank. The class voting allocations are the same
as above: 20% (A), 28% (B), 30% (C), and 22% (D). But there are now
more employees and thus each employee's voting power has been
diluted significantly.
Employee
Class

Number of
Employees

Votes per
Individual

Individual
Voting Power

Votes per
Class

Class Voting
Power

A
B
C
D

2
4
6
22

10
7
5
1

10%
7%
5%
1%

20
28
30
22

20%
28%
30%
22%

Total

34

na

na

100

100%

Suppose again that there are 60% "against" votes constituting
60 individual votes. It is not clear what combination of voters produced
the 60% outcome. Some combination of six employees at classes A and
B must have voted no, but it is unclear who they may be. Again,
intuitions and insights from personal dealings may shed some light, but
the conclusions may be far less reliable. Much of the deductive
reasoning power loses efficacy when votes become confidential due to
the ability to hide in numbers.
These simple examples can be generalized to the situations at
corporations of various sizes. They show that, once the number of
employees is scaled up to the size of public companies (even small
capitalization companies), gaming is difficult due to the increased
number of voters.
Probabilistic outcomes increase nonlinearly with each additional
employee. 179 For a public company with an employee headcount that is
greater than the simple numbers used in these example, the possible
permutations of voting combinations are too many to make accurate
inferences for a senior executive officer to take retaliatory action or
otherwise wrongfully influence voting outcomes so long as the allocation
is not gamed. In larger corporations (which tend to be public
companies), the problem of voting transparency is not so significant.

179. The mathematical principle of factorial (mathematical notation n!) is helpful to
understand the nonlinear increase in probabilistic outcomes. See JOHN E. FREUND, INTRODUCTION
TO PROBABILITY 14-18 (1973) (discussing permutations and factorials). The factorial function
calculates the number of potential combinations or permutations of a set of objects. For example,
for the set {A, B, C the factorial is calculated as: 3! = 3 x 2 x 1 = 6. This means that there are 6
combinations of the set JA, B, C}, which are: ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, CBA. The number of
combinations increase nonlinearly with each integer increase in a factorial. The factorial of 4!
24, but 5! = 120.
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These simple examples show several possibilities of gaming. The
structure of the scheme can be rigged: i.e., giving the employees most
likely to vote positively the most number of votes. Gaming can also be
internally influenced: i.e., employees voting strategically for selfinterested reasons, which affect the highest executive level employees
the most. If there is a likelihood of discovery, employees would selfgame the voting to avoid punishment or to curry favor.
D. Implementation
Despite the framework based on shareholder say-on-pay, several
issues are unique to employee voting. The problems are conceptualizing
the corporate hierarchy for the purpose of vote allocation, the right to
vote for foreign employees, and the actual mechanics of voting.
First, corporations have organizational charts and are defined
by a hierarchical system of titles, functions, responsibilities, and
powers. Conceptualizing the organization is not a difficult problem.
Human resources departments are in place and well suited to organize
a voting scheme. One can expect objections based on the alleged
difficulty of the task, but such opposition would not be credible given
that corporations are by nature organized hierarchically.
Second, although a public company may have sprawling
international operations, voting should be limited to U.S.-based
employees. The practical reason is that wage standards across the globe
vary radically.1 80 In terms of monitoring capabilities and inside
information, U.S.-based employees of U.S. firms would probably be
better, generally, due to knowledge gained from closer physical,
informational, and relational proximities.
Finally, the most difficult implementation issue is how to
allocate votes. The board should have discretion to exercise business
judgment, subject to regulatory guidelines against gaming, to allocate
votes within the corporate hierarchy in a way that achieves informed
voting. The allocation can be in the form of a report and proposal to the
SEC, discussing the corporation's organization, categorization of
employees, vote allocation assignments per category, and the rationale
for particular assignments. Even if allocating votes is difficult, boards
and executives are paid to exercise judgment on difficult matters.
180. For example, in 2011 the average Chinese worker earned approximately 42,000 yuan per
year, which is approximately $6900 (at a conversion rate of 1 yuan to $0.16). Wages and
Employment, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wageschina [perma.cc/7459-YQV8] (noting that the average worker made 3,500 yuan monthly in 2011).
This figure is significantly lower than the average U.S. worker pay. See supra note 39 and
accompanying table.
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Unlike shareholder voting-which occurs through an existing
proxy process-a company must create a new voting process to achieve
employee say-on-pay. This raises the question of cost. Under the
standard theory, agency cost is defined as the sum of the contracting
cost between principal and agent, monitoring cost by the principal, the
bonding cost by the agent, and the residual loss. 181 This theory suggests
that some rent extraction by CEOs may be efficient (economically
tolerable) if the monitoring costs of such behavior are greater than the
rent extracted.182
The cost of establishing voting will not be high relative to the
issue at stake. The organizational structure already exists, and the
most difficult aspect of constructing a voting scheme is the exercise of
judgment-not an outlay of any significant cash or hard resource costs.
Voting would not be a mandatory condition of employment, but, similar
to political voting, a voluntary act of participation.
Voting can be done electronically. Corporations can easily create
a voting portal in which employees can login through a company-issued
identification, such as a password or social security number, and vote
on the package. 8 3 Business enterprises achieve amazing feats of
organization, data collection, analysis, and use of information
technology.1 8 4 An objection that voting would be technologically
infeasible or too costly as a direct expenditure would defy credibility
based on everyday observations of the routine use of information
technology by many parts of society including business corporations.
In conclusion, the technical aspects and direct costs of
implementation are minimal. The real issue is whether employee sayon-pay would produce better corporate governance as to executive
compensation, and whether these benefits are outweighed by potential
objections. These issues are discussed in the next two sections.

181. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 308; see MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE
FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 86-87 (2000).

182. See Frydman & Jenter, supra note 158.
183. See Adams, supra note 18, at 432 (stating that full-circle evaluations can be administered
through the internet "without much added cost").
184. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-CardCompany Know About You?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2009, at MM40 (discussing how credit card companies can predict individual
consumer behavior through data collection and analysis).
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III. BENEFITS OF INTRAFIRM EMPLOYEE MONITORING

A. Advantages of Private Information
Employees, including management, collectively possess the
corporation's entire information content.18 5 The advantage of employees
as monitors compared to shareholders becomes apparent when we
consider the question of information through the lens of market
efficiency. Economists have categorized levels of market efficiency:
strong, semi-strong, and weak.18 6 The weak form states that past
information such as stock prices has been incorporated into the current
stock price, and it is certainly correct. 18 7 The semi-strong form states
that stock prices adjust immediately to all publicly available
information. There is a question of whether the market is always semistrong efficient,18 8 but one can say without controversy that the market
often rapidly incorporates publicly disclosed information such as press
releases, disclosures, and annual reports.1 8 9 The strong form states that
the stock price incorporates all public and private information, and this
version of market efficiency is certainly incorrect. 190 Public
185. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 800 (arguing that management and labor together
have important informational advantage over shareholders because they are "insiders" and
possess private information).
186. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (proposing that there are three types of market efficiency, which are
strong, semi-strong, and weak forms of efficiency); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565-92 (1984) (discussing
the efficient capital market hypothesis and the three forms of market efficiency).
187. FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI,
INSTRUMENTS 308-11 (2d ed. 1996).

CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND

188. See id. at 309 ("Evidence on semi-strong pricing efficiency is mixed."); see also WILLIAM
W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (7th ed. 2012) ("The number of EMH

supporters in the financial economic community has dwindled."); Robert J. Shiller, We'll Share the
Honors, and Agree to Disagree,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, at BU6 ("I have argued that the theory
makes little sense, except in fairly trivial ways. Of course, prices reflect available information. But
they are far from perfect."). The presumption of market efficiency is the basis for the fraud-on-themarket theory of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
241-47 (1988). There are nuances to market efficiency, such as the degree and time responsiveness
in which public information is absorbed, that are important in securities actions. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 167 (2009);
Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and IOb-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic,
and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV 7, 20 (1994); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 656 (2003). These nuances
are not relevant for the discussion here.
189. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014) ("Even the
foremost critics of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis acknowledge that public information
generally affects stock prices.").
190. "No one these days accepts the strongest version of the efficient capital market
hypothesis, under which non-public information automatically affects prices. That version is
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shareholders do not have private information. With this broad outline
of the efficient market hypothesis in mind, it is clear that even if
shareholder voting is informed (a questionable assumption in light of
rational apathy1 91 ), it only incorporates publicly available information,
which ultimately reduces to a matter of the stock price for
shareholders. 192
On the other hand, employees have not only all of the public
information available to shareholders, but they also collectively possess
all private information. As used here, "private information" is not a
specific reference to highly confidential, particularized information that
is typically subject to insider trading laws. 193 Rather, it refers to all
information relevant to the performance of the firm and its executives
that exists within the firm, but is not readily accessible to the public. It
is institutionally-held information. Such information may include
knowledge of specific matters of business operations and strategy, more
generalized information on the sense of organizational "well-being" and
trajectory, company morale and confidence, and the long-term
performance history of the company. These kinds of information are
indicators of past and present firm performance and expectation of
future performance. Until specific information is publicly disclosed,
they are private information held within the firm by the collective
employees.
If one believes that there is a one to one correlation between
information that is readily publicly available, such as public disclosures
and press releases, and the private information held by employees (that
is, the strong form of market efficiency), there would be no rationale for
employee monitoring on efficiency grounds. Shareholders can and
should perform the same function. However, no company is perfectly
transparent, and private information always exists.

empirically false: the public announcement of news (good and bad) has big effects on stock prices,
which could not happen if prices already incorporated the effect of non-public information." West
v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Leslie A. Jeng, Andrew Metrick
& Richard Zeckhauser, Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation
Perspective, 85 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 453, 453 (2003) (finding abnormal returns of more than
six percent per year from insider purchase); Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger
Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855, 855
(1981) (showing rapid rise of stock price to reflect merger announcements and acquisition
premiums).
191. See supra Section I.D.
192. See Kang, supra note 18,at 1301 ("However, even rationally ignorant shareholders can
monitor their company's performance at low cost with reference to simple proxies like share
price.").
193. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660 (1997) (involving misappropriation of
confidential information under the securities laws).
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Shareholder and employee monitoring can work at different
levels of market efficiency. 194 Shareholders are most likely to vote "no"
when share prices are declining, and as a result, can be said to reflect
the publicly available information. If employees have a say, they would
be most likely to vote "no" when the information they hold on the
executive's role in the corporation's past performance and expectation
for the future conflicts with the pay package. This would incorporate
private information into the voting mechanism. One view of the purpose
of corporate voting is "a means of error correction for decisions." 195 The
shareholder and employee votes, respectively, would correct potentially
erroneous decisions of boards on executive compensation that could
have significant impact on corporate earnings, executive incentives,
and broader social effects. Shareholders would correct errors on the
basis of the relationship between stock price and compensation, and
employees would correct errors on the basis of private information and
compensation. The idea of market efficiency suggests that there are
limits to shareholder knowledge and information, and that corporate
insiders have better information than the public market. Employee
voting therefore augments the information mix given to the board.
B. Reverse Monitoring
Employees are said to have many roles, including citizens at
work, stakeholders, human capital, and investors.1 96 Employees can
also be monitors. In this case, the function is reverse monitoring:
employees monitor their coworkers, including their supervisors, and are
not just the targets of monitoring themselves by the company writ
large.1 97 We typically think of evaluation and monitoring in the
corporate hierarchy as a sequence of top-down processes emanating
from the board to the senior officers, and progressively down toward the
base of the pyramid. But in corporate management practice, monitoring
can be multidirectional.
The theory of reverse monitoring has been applied in different
contexts. It has been suggested that, contrary to conventional wisdom

194. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 800-01 (suggesting that shareholders can monitor
at the level of market efficiency while employees can monitor the firm as "insiders").
195. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 168, at 130; see Kang, supra note 18, at 1326
("Thompson and Edelman's real point, I think, is that shareholders are well positioned to develop
and vote on negative preferences about corporate management in ways that they are not similarly
positioned with respect to affirmative preferences. I agree.").
196. Arthurs & Mumm6, supra note 29, at 352-67.
197. Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based
Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24, 1446 (2007).
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that stock options impart ownership incentives on employees, employee
stock options promote a reverse monitoring function, wherein
employees are incentivized to monitor peer misconduct or shirking so
as to avoid a decline in the value of their options. 198 Whistleblower
protection and qui tam actions are based on the idea that employees can
monitor the corporation and their peers for wrongdoing on behalf of the
corporation or the public. 199 Reverse monitoring is based on the belief
that employees should have both the incentive and the means to
200
monitor organizational governance.
Reverse monitoring is also commonly used in management
practice. Many major public corporations routinely use "full-circle" or
"360 evaluations" where subordinates evaluate the performance of their
supervisors. 01 Such evaluations steadily gained acceptance in the
1980s and 1990s both as a decision-making tool and a method for
evaluating management. 20 2 Full-circle evaluations provide crucial
information on the performance of senior managers from those they
supervise. This Article extends the concept so that all subordinates
participate in a firm-wide evaluation of senior executive officers. It is
not clear why the CEO and the most senior executive officers, also being
employees, should be inherently exempt from such evaluations and
management practices that are applied to most other employees. Voting
would simply formalize opinions already held.
198. Id. at 1423-25. The idea is that individual employees can do more harm to the
corporation than they can increase value. Stock options incentivize reverse monitoring by
employees whose options may be subject to destruction of value by other employees. Id. at 142324.
199. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-49 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)) (providing
whistleblower protection); Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (same); False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012) (providing for qui tam action forfraud against the U.S.
government).
200. See Hannes, supra note 197, at 1424 ("It is hard to imagine anyone in a better position
to fulfill this [monitoring] mission [than employees], and because their explicit duties do not
include this task, it is wise to give them an incentive to do so .... "); see generally Orly Lobel,
Citizenship, OrganizationalCitizenship,and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV.
433 (2009) (discussing the role of employees in ensuring the legality and compliance obligations of
organizations).
201. See Adams, supra note 18, at 429-35 (discussing the development, use, and benefits of
full-circle evaluations). Companies like Walt Disney, General Motors, American Airlines, Intel,
DuPont, IBM, and RCA have used full-circle evaluations. Id. at 431, 433. According to one survey,
ninety percent of Fortune 1000 companies surveyed had implemented some form of full-circle or
multisource evaluation system. Id. at 433 (citing Mark R. Edwards & Ann J. Ewen, How to Manage
Performance and Pay with 360-Degree Feedback, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., MayfJune
1996, at 41); see also H. John Bernardin & Richard W. Beatty, Can Subordinate Appraisals
Enhance ManagerialProductivity?, 28 SLOAN MANAGEMENT REV. 63, 68-72 (1987) (arguing for
giving employees "voice" in the performance evaluation of their supervisors).
202. Adams, supranote 18, at 429.
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The idea that employees can serve as monitors of peers and
superiors is based on the fact that they collectively possess all private
information. 2 3 Not even the CEO would possess this quantity of
information, and the board certainly would not. An employee vote would
divulge this information content. Since this inside information is
valuable, the rationale for reverse monitoring is compelling.
Employee monitoring is costless and requires only awareness. 20 4
One may question the quality of the information that is revealed. In
large corporations, direct observations cannot be made in some
circumstances. Most CEOs would be incompetent to evaluate most
employees in the company due to the fact that they would not have
personal observations arising from direct professional dealings. As a
factual corollary, most employees are not in day-to-day contact with the
CEO and other senior executives. Does this mean that employees would
be equally incompetent to judge the CEO's performance? The apparent
symmetry of argument does not hold. Employees are competent to judge
executive performance.
Interpersonal dealings with the CEO are not the only ways that
employees can serve a monitoring and evaluation function. There is
direct assessment when employees execute the decisions of the CEO
and observe the influence of such decisions on the corporate
performance and prospects. Information in a corporation is not like
water, always flowing downwards; it is like air, ubiquitous in the
complex networks of professional relationships and institutional
processes. All employees have organizational awareness resulting from
being a part of the firm's complex information network. Information is
transmitted
and received multi-directionally
in a complex
organization. 20 5 The general sense of the collective employees is often
accurate. 20 6 One need not be a historian to understand that there have
been countless past instances in which leaders of organizations-be
they military, corporate, civic, or governmental-have lost the
confidence of their subordinates or constituents for reasons that proved
to be well founded. Such failed leaders frequently lose their jobs or
203. "[I]nformation is always more complete and reliable within the firm than outside it."
PHAN, supra note 22, at 15.
204. Hannes, supra note 197, at 1424.
205. See CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 104-11 (1938) (describing
the networks of relationships and communication channels in a complex organization and showing
the mathematical permutations of relationships within a firm).
206. Cf. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 524 n.437 (2005) (discussing
the ability of the futures markets to predict accurately on a probabilistic basis political and
sporting outcomes); see generally JAMES SUROWJECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005) (discussing

how large groups of people accurately observe, assess, or solve better than a few individuals).
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suffer other consequences as a result of the collective disappointment
and disapproval of their constituents. In the context of corporate
governance, the problem to solve is how to deliver the information that
is held by subordinates to the decision-maker (the board) consistent
with the traditional principle of the primacy of board authority.
It is doubtful that the board, as a collective group working parttime and relying on information provided by senior management, would
know more about the performance of the CEO than the collective
employees, especially the cadre of middle and senior managers and the
senior executive team. From an informational standpoint, the problem
for the board becomes greater as the corporation increases in size and
complexity, and as the board increasingly relies on information
provided by the CEO and the outside advisers hired by the senior
executives. 20 7 Since employees possess highly relevant information, fullrole in evaluating the
circle evaluations can serve a reverse monitoring
20 8
executives.
senior
of
packages
compensation
Lastly, there is a special form of monitoring and assessment that
may have particular usefulness in executive compensation. In some
instances, executive compensation may be patently excessive or
obscene-either based on absolute amount 20 9 or in relation to firm
performance 210 or the average worker pay. 211 These cases may incite a
collective visceral reaction that serves a useful purpose in these
extreme cases. Although even gross excessiveness of pay may be unable
to overcome shareholder inertia (at least sufficiently to obtain a
majority negative vote), monitoring by employees may be more effective
in these special situations. Such monitoring may signal an error in the
business judgment of the board, which has virtually complete legal
authority absent breach of loyalty, and thus places soft constraints on
potential cases of gross error of judgment.
207. See MACEY, supra note 49, at 83-84 (explaining the reliance of boards on management
to provide information and the resulting power dynamic leading to "board capture").
208. Cf. Adams, supra note 18, at 435, 437 (arguing that institutional investors use full-circle
evaluations from middle managers, among others, to evaluate the compensation packages of senior
executives).
209. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (noting that
a corporate executive was paid approximately $130 million for fourteen months of work).
210. See, e.g., Annie Lowry, Pay Still High at Bailed-Out Companies,Report Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29fbusiness/generous-executive-pay-at-bailedout-companies-treasury-watchdog-says.html?r=0 [perma.cc/2R96-VUP2] (reporting that executive
compensation was high even for financial firms bailed out during the financial crisis).
211. See, e.g., Elliot Blair Smith & Phil Kuntz, CEO Pay 1, 795-to-I Multiple of Wages Skirts
U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04[perma.cc/E9PX-67FE]
30/ceo-pay- 1-795-to-1-multiple-of-workers-skirts-law-as-sec-delays.html
(reporting that the CEO of J.C. Penney was paid $53.3 million while the average employee was
paid $29,688).

740

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3:695

C. InformationAsymmetry in Governance
A well-known paradox of corporate governance is that the board
is the ultimate managerial authority charged with "managing" senior
executives, 212 but the latter possesses greater information. 2 13 The
typical board meets four to six times per year for an average of four
hours per meeting. 2 14 Information is the source of power and
influence. 21 5 Management power inures from the distinct information
asymmetry between board and management. 2 6 If the board had the
same or superior information, it could always second-guess or
countermand management opinions, recommendations, and decisions.
In the logical extreme, there would be no need for operational
managers.
In reality, much of the corporation's information is held below
the board level, synthesized, and then sent upwards in the corporate
hierarchy in the reporting process. Senior managers are the conduit
through which information flows to the board. In most corporate
hierarchies, the board does not have much contact with lower level
employees in the course of managing the business and affairs of the
corporation. This is not a failing of boards, but instead a limitation of
corporate organization. Consider a corporation that has 50,000
employees, 1,000 of whom are non-executive managers. Not only do
many (or most) board members have primary careers elsewhere, but
their numbers are also woefully insufficient for operational
management. Rather, operational management is the job of the senior
officers. The liability scheme in corporation law recognizes this reality
that the board, while technically the ultimate managers, cannot directly
2 17
engage the largest segment of management.

212. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,§ 141(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1969) (AM. BAR
ASS'N, amended 2010).
213. MACEY, supra note 49, at 83 ('Generally speaking, management's control of the flow of
information to the board of directors creates a dynamic in which management is able to capture
its board of directors by controlling the nature of the information available to directors when
making decisions."); PHAN, supra note 22, at 145; see ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 295 (5th ed. 2011) ("Directors can never know as much about the
operation of the company as management, so they are dependent on the CEO for being supplied
with accurate, timely, and material information.").
214. PHAN, supra note 22, at 37.
215. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 800 ("Management has important informational
advantages over shareholders because members of management are 'insiders' with important
information on the day-to-day running of the firm.").
216. MACEY, supra note 49, at 83-84, 96; PHAN, supra note 22, at 146.
217. A failure of the duty to monitor is "possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law
upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment." In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Delaware, the standard is "a sustained or systematic failure
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Just because boards cannot in reality actively engage in
operational management does not mean that the knowledge gained
from such management, if it could hypothetically be aggregated, would
be irrelevant. Indeed, if a board could acquire such knowledge, the
information would be highly relevant toward the evaluation of senior
officers. Consider the agency problem of monitoring corporate
executives through a Coasean lens. In the context of legal entitlements,
if transaction costs were zero, parties would rearrange their rights in a
way that maximizes efficiency irrespective of the initial assignment of
the rights. 218 But once transaction costs are considered, the
rearrangement of rights only occurs if the increase in production
exceeds the cost of bringing about this reordering. 2 19 The law should
initially assign rights in a way that reflects the hypothetical bargain of
the parties; 220 organizational law can be analyzed from this
22 1
perspective.
One can analyze the agency cost problem of monitoring
corporate executives through a Coasean lens. If monitoring costs were
zero, the board would vigorously monitor and manage executives. This
monitoring would entail acquiring and analyzing information held in
the firm. The board would solicit information from employees, in the
very same way that senior executives solicit information from
subordinates. Since the real world has monitoring costs and limited
resources, such operational management is infeasible. However, if
information conveyance can be cost effective, the board would benefit.
One such device is employee reverse monitoring. The point is fairly
obvious: Would employees have something to add in a hypothetical
board deliberation on the CEO's performance if the interchange and
monitoring costs were low? Although a board cannot directly acquire
of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system." Id. at 971.
218. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-7, 15 (1960).
219. Id. at 15-16. Unless the initial arrangement of rights established by the legal system is
efficient, "the costs of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through the
market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of
production which it would bring, may never be achieved." Id. at 16.
220. Robert J. Rhee, Toward ProceduralOptionality:Private Orderingof PublicAdjudication,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 566 (2009). Courts have used the analytic heuristic of an ex ante
hypothetical transaction to determine the most efficient rule of law. See, e.g., Stockberger v. United
States, 332 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (noting that "[h]ypothetical-contract analysis
is a powerful tool for understanding tort law and determining its scope"); Bamford v. Turnley
(1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33, rev'g (1860) 122 Eng. Rep. 25 (analyzing a nuisance case from a
hypothetical decision of an individual owner of the properties in question).
221. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 37 (2010) ("When filling gaps
in the corporate contracts, courts cannot look to the actual intent of thousands of parties so they
make up a hypothetical 'intent' based on what the courts view as reasonable.").
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the knowledge gained from either direct operational management or
communication with employees, the mechanism of employee voting can
be an efficient substitute for transmitting relevant information to the
board.
Employee voting is a modest device that provides a more diverse
mix of information to the board. An important aspect of say-on-pay is
the quantum of information: a simple percentage signifying approval or
disapproval. Shareholder say-on-pay provides direct, relevant input on
the opinion of shareholders. This opinion is based on market and public
information. Employee say-on-pay remedies the problem of information
asymmetry between board and management by providing direct,
relevant input on the opinion of employees.
In the ideal world of zero monitoring costs, a perfectly informed
board would gather information from both senior management and
employees, who collectively hold the entire information content of the
firm, 222 and assign appropriate levels of materiality in the exercise of
business judgment. Employee voting provides relevant information that
is relatively costless. This mechanism helps to offset the informational
power of management over the board, which can promote board capture
and work against good corporate governance.
D. Durationof Information and Outlook
In addition to the advantage of having private information,
employees have a longer-term experience and outlook with respect to
the corporation. The average hold period of shareholders is short, and
getting shorter. 223 The average shareholder may not even hold the stock
of a company for a full year. 224 The short-term time horizon of

222. In some companies, the board has complete access to employees according to their
corporate governance guidelines. For example, the board of Intel has complete access while the
board of General Motors is restricted in its access by management. PHAN, supra note 22, at 17273.
223. See Robert C. Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in CorporateAmerica: Focus on Executive
Compensation, GOVERNANCE STUD. AT BROOKINGS, May 2014, at 3 n.5 (stating that the average
holding period for US stocks has fallen from seven years in 1960 to two years in 1992 to less than
eight months in 2007); Roe, supra note 140 (suggesting that large mutual funds hold stocks for
approximately 1.5 years); Andrew Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of
England, Patience and Finance, Speech at the Oxford China Business Forum 17 chart 9 (Sept. 9,
2010), http://www.bis.org/review/rO0909e.pdf [perma.cc/6338-QZV7] (showing the average hold
period of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange in 2005 to be approximately one year).
224. See Pozen, supra note 223 (stating that the average holding period for US stocks was less
than eight months in 2007); Jesse Eisinger, Challenging the Long-Held Belief in 'Shareholder
Value', N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/
27/challenging-the-long-held-belief-in-shareholder-value/?_r=0
[perma.cc/3C2W-UWM6]
("The
average holding period of a stock was eight years in 1960; today, it's four months.").
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shareholders, and managers responding to shareholder short-termism,
has become a source of concern and been blamed for many ills in
corporate governance and the financial markets.225
Short-termism affects shareholder monitoring. Firstly, in
addition to a minority shareholder's lack of incentive, a short-term
shareholder would also be rational in being apathetic toward
monitoring a firm that she expects to exit shortly. Secondly, a shortterm investor invests with information necessary to make the
investment within the expected hold period. There may not be longterm "look back" into the past and "look forward" into the future. For
the purposes of assessments of firm performance and outlook, and their
connection to executive performance, the quality of the information may
be suspect. Each individual shareholder has knowledge of the firm, but
this knowledge is limited by public disclosure. Furthermore, many
shareholders, if not most, are not active consumers of public
information, but instead rely on an efficient market to do the hard work
226
of incorporating information into the stock price.
On the other hand, employees have specific information and a
longer term investment of careers in the corporation. It is true that
many employees are transient and that most corporate employees
change jobs during the course of a career. However, the turnover rate
in the labor market is far lower than the turnover rate of
stockholding. 227 For corporate managers, both midlevel and senior, the
human capital investment in a company is even longer than rank-andfile employees, who are more transient.
Employees have longer term duration and outlook, and this
perspective is significant. They monitor and assess from this
perspective. Like shareholders, they have the same access to public
information and stock price information; unlike shareholders, they also
possess specific information on the firm and longer duration of
225. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 771 (suggesting that management has succumbed to
shareholders' short-term interests and that employees with longer term interest in the firm have
no means to provide input on corporate governance); see generally PAVLOS E. MASOUROS,
CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION: HOW SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND SHORT-TERMISM
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECLINE OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIES (2013); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-

Termism, the FinancialCrisis, and CorporateGovernance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); Mark J. Roe,
CorporateShort-Termism-In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. LAW. 977 (2013).
226. This is the basic principle underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory of securities fraud.
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014) (explaining that the
typical investor transacts at the price set by the market "in reliance on the integrity of that price"
rather than scrutinizing all public information); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42
(1988) (explaining the basis of the fraud-on-the-market theory).
227. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover-May
2015 (July 7, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/jolts_07072015.pdf [perma.cc/ FA73S425] (stating that the quits rate was 1.9% and the total separations rate was 3.3%).
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information. Employees have longer term investments of human capital
and careers, and accordingly they think in longer duration terms.
E. FiduciaryIdeals
Employee monitoring promotes fiduciary ideals and board
independence. The "board capture" criticism asserts that corporate
governance has broken down in the realm of executive compensation. 228
The board is a fiduciary of the corporation. While the legal rules of
corporate governance make it exceedingly difficult to impose liability
for the board's breach of fiduciary duty, fiduciary ideals set forth
normative virtues for director motives and behavior. 229 However, there
are many instances in which fiduciary duties are not in fact kept. Is
there any doubt by the litigator or the corporate lawyer that perfect
processes can and do mask improper intentions that would never see
the light of a courtroom? 230 Corporate governance and adjudications in
corporate law are not so special that they rise above the limitations of
the adjudicatory process and the nature of truth. 231
In executive compensation, the fiduciary ideal is axiomatic and
incontestable: the board should award compensation free of structural
bias in favor and independent of management, informed with all public
and private information available, based on the idea of pay-forperformance, and without heed to any sense of executive entitlement or
rent extraction. Employees can advance this fiduciary ideal. The
information that they communicate enhances informed decision232
making, which is the hallmark of the fiduciary duty of care.

228. See supra Section I.A.
229. Commentators have suggested that corporate law incorporates standards of conduct as
opposed to legal rules of liability. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439-58 (1993)
(examining the divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review); Edward B.
Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLAL. REV. 1009, 101217 (1997) (discussing the development of standards of conduct within corporations).
230. See MACEY, supra note 49, at 30-31, 74-75 (criticizing the process-oriented nature of
corporate governance following Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985)).
231. For example, the old chestnut, Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1976),
can be understood from the divide between the probable and the provable:
It can be explained by improper but unprovable motives such as a vain attempt to
support short-term stock prices for the purpose of executive compensation, or
obfuscating the nature of a failed investment which would have been made clearer with
the recognition of a loss. Thus, Kamin can be seen as an unprovable duty of loyalty case
that had to be brought as a duty of care case.;
Rhee, supra note 77, at 1149 n.56.
232. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) ('The duty of the
directors of a company to act on an informed basis ...forms the duty of care .. "); Smith v. Van
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In corporate governance, the board and the management share
a necessary symbiotic relationship. A board depends heavily on senior
management for information that it uses to make decisions. Control of
information is an essential source of power and influence in an
organization, and it is why senior executives have control and influence
even as the board has the power to fire them. However, a negative
aspect of the codependency of board and management is structural
bias. 233 CEOs have significant influence on board compensation and
nominations. Insider board members, such as senior executives, are
subject to the CEO's authority in their roles as officers. 23 4 The board is
a social institution populated by an elite group of individuals who
routinely interact with each other in their business, social, and political
worlds. 235 Although a genial and collegial working relationship between
the board and the management is a good thing, it can also lead to
236
structural bias.
A number of devices tend to offset structural bias and power
balance and empower greater board independence. Board members are
subject to fiduciary duty.2 37 They routinely retain outside advisers on
various matters such as lawyers and financial advisers. There are legal
requirements on the appointment of independent directors, 23 8 the

Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (describing a director's duty to exercise informed
business judgment).
233. See MACEY, supra note 49, at 57-65 (suggesting that boards are susceptible to "board
capture" by management).
234. See, e.g., ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (stating that certain officers and directors "acted as-no other word
captures it so accurately-stooges" for a controlling shareholder); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2,
9 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (involving business transactions by the corporation with "a close relative of the
chief executive officer of a corporation, and one of its dominant directors").
235. See generally Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1259 (2005) (discussing the social environment of a board and the resulting
behavior of board members).
236. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 61-79 (discussing structural bias in
compensation); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., StructuralBias, Special Litigation Committees, and
the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1307-09 (2005) (discussing
"structural bias"). See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and
StructuralBias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007) (discussing structural bias in compensation and the
Disney compensation litigation).
237. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A. 2d 345, 360-61 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
238. See, e.g., N.Y.S.E LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 87, at § 303A.01 ("Listed
companies must have a majority of independent directors.").
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composition of important committees of the board, 239 and board
240
deliberation procedures.
Employee monitoring can also counteract structural bias. The
board would receive information independent of management control.
A board would find it uncomfortable to ignore a negative vote of either
shareholders or employees. The sense of public accountability would be
great. Ignoring the concerns of employees, particularly concerns arising
from the managerial ranks, would be detrimental to business
operations. The board would be viewed as insensitive to employees and
managers in general if they did ignore such responses. If excessive
executive compensation is a possibility due to structural bias, employee
voting could offset some of this.
Employee voting can further enhance board independence
because it can provide a factual basis and justification for the board's
compensation decision even when structural bias may tend to work the
opposite effect. Consider different scenarios: a board may want to award
high compensation in a facially difficult situation for proper reasons; or,
it may not want to award high compensation but the social, political,
and bargaining situation is complex. A normative basis for engaging in
24 1
compensation negotiation would be helpful.
Consider a facially difficult situation. The board of a distressed
company proposes to award a CEO with high compensation. Depending
on the circumstance, a board could rightly award high compensation in
such cases. Management talent would be needed to right the ship, and
such talent would have opportunity costs. Good executives may have
other better opportunities and may be wary of entering into a bad
situation unless the incentives compensate for those foregone
opportunities. These situations can be politically difficult internally and
externally. But suppose employees, properly recognizing the situation,
vote positively. Who can complain in such a case?
Consider the case where a board seeks to rein in compensation
for rational reasons, but has complex considerations in scaling back
executive pay. 242 Working against the board's inclination on executive
239. See, e.g., id. at § 303A.04(a) ('isted companies must have a nominating/corporate
governance committee composed entirely of independent directors."); id. at § 303A.05(a) ("Listed
companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.").
240. See, e.g., id. at § 303A.03 ('To empower non-management directors to serve as a more
effective check on management, the non-management directors of each listed company must meet
at regularly scheduled executive sessions without management.").
241.

See G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR

REASONABLE PEOPLE 89-114 (2d ed. 2006) (suggesting that various kinds of leverage exist to
bargain successfully).
242. See PHAN, supra note 22, at 47-62 (presenting a case study of a company and board that
were highly influenced by the CEO).
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pay may be the social bonds between board members and the CEO, a
prior history of high wages, CEO influence on particular board
members such as insider members, and a reticence to disturb
collegiality. Many of these factors create the structural bias in favor of
CEO deference. In this situation, a negative employee vote can give the
board leverage in an arms-length negotiation, and normative
justification for the decision to reduce compensation.
F. Public Monitoringand PoliticalLegitimization
At this moment in time and compensation levels, the public has
come to view executive compensation as rent extraction gained through
the power of position, unconstrained by personal qualms. 243 Given the
extent of the problem, one cannot predict with complete confidence
where future reform, if any, will go. Reform of compensation can be done
through tax law. 244 It can be done through flat restrictions or caps on
compensation. 245 In the extreme case, the government can have a direct
role in determining how much an executive can pocket in compensation
246
through special taxes or wage control.
This Article argues that employees can serve as public monitors
and gatekeepers. 247 Public approval is needed to legitimize, socially and
politically, high executive compensation, though at this time public
disapproval and shaming have not deterred the conspicuous awarding
of compensation. 248 Without this legitimacy, boards will continue to feel
a pervasive public pressure even as they continue to approve high
compensation packages.
Even as CEOs are enjoying high compensation, there is longterm uncertainty. Social cohesion in a corporation was stronger in the
past than it is now. 249 Current compensation levels strike discord in
broad constituencies. A compensation package should be broadly

243. See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 53 (noting that CEOs have amassed riches through "an
enhanced ability to take more from the corporation that they are supposed to be serving, and
weaker qualms about, and enhanced public toleration of, doing so").
244. See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation,
85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 592-634 (2007) (proposing a tax-based solution).
245. See generally Ingolf Dittmann, Ernst Maug & Dan Zhang, Restricting CEO Pay, 17 J.
CORP. FIN. 1200 (2011) (examining such a measure).
246. See Landon Thomas, Jr., Britainto Levy a One-Time Tax on Banker Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com2009/12/10business/global/1Opound.html
(Dec.
9,
2009),
[perma.cc/QF9V-M6KN].
247. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006).

248. See supra Section I.A.
249. See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 82.
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supported by the many constituents of the corporation, including, in the
broadest sense, the public. Since executive compensation continues to
be a controversial issue among shareholders and other corporate
constituents, it is a powerful signaling device. 25 0 Employee voting can
legitimate high executive compensation. Suppose the CEO's pay
package was approved by shareholders and employees, and, informed
by this advice, a board exercises its independent judgment and awards
high compensation. The compensation is legitimated not only by the
legal authority of the board under corporate law, but also publicly
legitimated in some sense by the approval of all major constituents of
the corporate enterprise.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

A. Information Quality
A potential objection to employee monitoring is that employee
voting will not yield quality information. The vote could be tainted by
irrelevant, heterogeneous considerations, or incomplete knowledge. For
example, objectors could argue that voting could be tainted by personal
feelings toward the CEO, sociopolitical agendas of individual workers
or their unions, social and economic class envy, standardless measures
of proper salaries, limited knowledge of firm performance and economic
metrics, etc. 251 A key difference between shareholders and employees is
that shareholders, for the most part, vote with principally one criterion
in mind-stock value.2 52 Employees may apply multiple criteria. The
objection questions the reliability of the information elicited.
This objection is flawed. Firstly, the largest portion of the voting
class are middle and senior level managers who would be, as a collective
whole, highly knowledgeable about the performance of both the
company and its most senior officers. These managers already evaluate
inferior employees and participate in the setting of their salaries, and
they may themselves be subject to 360 evaluations from their
subordinates. Presumably, these managers would also apply in good
faith the same professional standard of conduct to the evaluation of
company and senior officer performance. There is no reason to believe
that, when it comes to the evaluation of the CEO, employees discard
professionalism; and if it is the case, that fact may be material
250. PHAN, supra note 22, at 155.
251. Cf Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
815, 819-30 (2001) (discussing the problem of strategic voting or conflict of interest voting among
security holders in a way that deviates from efficient outcome).
252. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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information on the CEO's leadership quality and the perception of
confidence, which is an important job qualification of a chief executive.
With respect to the limits of employee knowledge, it is true that
no single person-including the CEO or a board member-holds perfect
knowledge of all inside information. But a suggestion that an employee
is disqualified due to a lack of perfect knowledge is a straw man
argument. Information is never perfect in the sense of transparency of
knowledge, preferences, and motivations. The real question is whether
the information is relevant and material, as well as the cost and the
benefit of procuring the information.
A firm is the collection of its employees, each holding a unique
packet of information. In this respect, a firm can be seen as an
information exchange. 253 If so, the voting outcome would in many cases
accurately reflect the collective information held. 254 In any individual
vote in any voting scheme, opinions determining the vote may be
misguided or ill-informed. Mass voting, such as political voting, is
messy in the sense that voter preferences are heterogeneous and any
number of factors may influence an individual vote. However, systemic
errors are difficult to achieve since random errors tend to cancel each
other. Any outcome that adopts a systemic view would reflect the
255
overall information held within the corporation.
Although employees may bring different perspectives in the good
faith exercise of evaluating performance, their criteria would not be
random. On the whole, they would fairly reflect rank in the hierarchy.
The higher in the hierarchy an employee is, the more that employee's
criteria would seek to evaluate the CEO's job performance and the less
they would be sensitive to wage differential. Greater seniority promotes
greater affinity and identification with high paying jobs and those who
hold them. There may also be some natural affinity toward supporting
executive pay. At the lower levels, employees may pose a problem
arising from multiple criteria and perspectives. They are the lowest
paid workers, and thus would be naturally skeptical of high wages. On
average, they may be less educated and less informed about the state of
the company than their managers. They may be influenced by
253. See BARNARD, supra note 205, at 73, 82 (defining an organization as a "system of
consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons."); PHAN, supra note 22, at 3
('There is increasing realization that a firm is a place where people meet to exchange specific
information for the purpose of engaging in production.").
254. See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 206 (discussing how group decisions reflect the
aggregated information of the group).
255. Cf. Kang, supra note 18, at 1316-17 ('Voting in government elections nonetheless
effectively translates public preferences. . . . One consequence of retrospective voting is that
elections often are effectively a referendum on the incumbent's performance, particularly when
the incumbent is in the race.").
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organized labor. They are the furthest removed from direct dealings
with the CEO. Their evaluations of performance may be uninformed or
suspect. The risk of the application of more diverse criteria is greater.
If the lower ranks are problematic, why permit voting by the
vast majority of employees? Despite the risks, the lowest rank and file
employees serve useful functions in the overall scheme. The possibility
of excluding a large majority of employees increases the risk of gaming.
Mandatory inclusiveness reduces this risk. There is some benefit to
egalitarian inclusion of all employees. 256 Inclusiveness would facilitate
political legitimization of executive compensation. 257 From a business
perspective, the exclusion of the majority of employees would be
demoralizing and undermine organizational cohesion. When a CEO's
pay is so large as to absolute amount or wage differential, the
expression of collective outrage would serve an important public and
governance function. Natural skepticism of high compensation, a
systemic bias perhaps, would tend to offset the opposite structural bias
held by the most senior executives and board members who are a part
of the same social, economic, and professional class.
As discussed earlier, the balance of considerations suggests a
weighed voting scheme. Since the voting allocation is based on a reverse
pyramid structure, it counterbalances any significant objections based
on giving unknowledgeable rank and file employees a controlling
block. 258 Neither rank and file employees nor senior officers have the
controlling block of votes. That block should be held by the middle and
senior managerial ranks. The assigned weights acknowledge the
potential risks to information quality. These benefits and
countermeasures outweigh the particular problems of information
quality at the lower employee level.
B. RationallyApathetic Employees
Like political citizens or corporate shareholders, employees may
be rationally apathetic. Like political voting, employees may think that
the personal cost-benefit of voting is not worth it, or that their single
vote (vote allocation) may not make a difference. Some employees may

256. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 25, at 76-105 (describing the benefit of loyalty engendered
by members having participatory voice in an organization).
257. See supra note 164.
258. For example, suppose 90% of a company's employees can be called "rank and file" and
they hold 10% of the vote allocation. Even if all 10% of the vote is voted "Against" (a
probabilistically unlikely outcome), the remaining 90% of the vote is held by 10% of the managerial
ranks who would be the most knowledgeable voters. The 10% "Against" votes would not sway the
outcome in most cases.
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not care at all about the issue at stake. Some may consider the right a
chore without any tangible payoff. Such objections do not withstand
scrutiny because there are significant differences between political or
shareholder voting and employee voting.
In political voting, there is not an insignificant cost, which is
time off from work or leisure and trekking to the voting booth. If this
cost of political voting did not exist, voting turnout would be far greater.
In contrast, employee voting is virtually cost-free. Waiting and
procedural processing are not involved. Voting can be done online, and
at work. The most significant cost to the employee is the time used to
weigh the amount of pay with the executive's performance. This
consideration, while real, is not time consuming in the mold of
performing the employee's job. It would be in the mold of a judgment
call: Given the company's performance and trajectory and the CEO's
responsibility for them, has the CEO earned the proposed
compensation? Employees will already have a good sense of the
company's performance, trajectory, and the executive's performance.
Due to weighed voting, those who have the best information have
greater voting power, and thus also have the incentive to vote.
A problem with the rationally apathetic shareholder is that the
shareholder may not have very good information on the issues put to
them. The benefits of diversification increases the work required to be
informed. If so, this calls into question the informational quality of the
vote and the motivation to vote. Consider the most basic shareholder
governance function-voting on directors. Suppose the shareholder
holds a modestly diversified portfolio of thirty stocks 259 and each
company has a ten-member board with no cross memberships. A
shareholder may not have good opinions about each of these threehundred directors. Rational apathy and situational ignorance may be
related.
Employees are situated differently. They know a great deal
about the company, its competitors, its position in the competitive
landscape, and its trajectory. In many companies, the information flow
within the firm is complex and efficient. Unlike shareholders and the
many directors and officers in their portfolios, employees will have
greater information and familiarity with the senior executives of the
company. Since they have more information and their voting is almost
259. See Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio, 22 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANALYSIS 353, 355 (1987) (showing that a portfolio of 30 stocks would result in an expected
variance of under 20.87%, whereas a portfolio of 1000 stocks would result in an expected variance
of 19.21%); see also Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure, and the
Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 372 (2009) (suggesting that significant
diversification can be achieved with a mix of 30-35 stocks).
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costless, the degree of apathy seen in shareholders will tend to be less
in employees.
Lastly, employees are more motivated to vote than shareholders.
They have undiversified firm-specific investment in their career. 260 In
cases where employees are vested in their careers and "exit" is far from
frictionless, 26 1 they will have incentive to vote and participate so long
as adequate measures are taken to protect confidentiality. 262 This
incentive arises from different motivations and sentiments. Voting
would be almost cost free, and so the degree of shirking would be less.
We can also assume that as a collective whole, unless morale has
deteriorated, employees care about their company and its prospects.
The principle of meritocracy undergirds the sense of fairness in a
competitive market society. Thus, employees would be motivated to
speak on the issue of fairness in wage and sharing of economic
production.
C. Balance in CorporateGovernance
In U.S. corporate governance, employees have had few formal
roles. Most boards of public companies do not have employee
representatives, 263 and senior executives typically view their
relationship from a hierarchical perspective where they transmit
information and directives down the chain of command. Corporate law
does not prohibit a corporation from establishing greater employee
participation, but this is not the practice among public companies. A
potential objection may be that employee voting would significantly
alter the balance of power in corporate governance away from the
traditional triad of board, management, and shareholder. This concern
is unfounded.

260. See BLAIR & ROE, supra note 29, at 58-87; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific
Investments: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738 n.60 (2006) (noting
that employees make undiversified firm-specific investments).
261. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 25, at 21-29 (describing a constituent's choice of "exit" or
"voice" whenever an organization is perceived to be declining or unsatisfactory to the member).
262. See supra Section II.C.
263. The U.S. corporate governance system is different from countries like Germany that
carves out a formal role for employees in its system of codetermination. See generally JOHN T.
ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE (2009)

(discussing the German model ofcodetermination); BLAIR & ROE, supra note 29, at 163-238; IRENE
LYNCH-FANNON, WORKING WITHIN TWO KINDS OF CAPITALISM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
EMPLOYEE STAKEHOLDING: US AND EU PERSPECTIVES (2003) (comparing the European model of

corporate governance, which has a greater role in employee participation than the US model);
David Charny, The German CorporateGovernance System, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 145, 145-66
(1998) (same).
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If the objection is that employee say-on-pay may influence the
board, this is no objection at all. That is the stated purpose. Legally,
say-on-pay does not diminish or change the board's legal authority to
manage the affairs of the corporation. 264 It is an advisory vote. At most,
say-on-pay exerts soft constraints on the board's virtually unfettered
265
legal authority inherent in the business judgment rule.
Ideally, say-on-pay should influence the board. When
shareholders leave the couch of apathy, their opinion on executive
compensation is relevant to the mix of information. Employee opinion
is also relevant. Employees observe the CEO on a daily basis. They
implement the CEO's strategies and decisions, and they are wellpositioned to assess the efficacy of corporate decisions, the CEO's
performance, and leadership. These points are obvious and
uncontroversial. So why wouldn't directors, in good faith, want to know
the opinion of employees to be better informed in their decision-making?
The answer cannot be that such opinions are wholly irrelevant or
immaterial. 266 The answer must be that directors do not want
additional constraints on their decision-making, which is no legitimate
answer when the additional constraint promotes informed decisionmaking.
Communicating relevant information to the board is a core
function of corporate governance. Say-on-pay does not contain a
complex or overwhelming amount of information, and it does not
displace a board's ultimate business judgment. Employee voting does
not tilt the balance in corporate governance, formally or informally. It
is consistent with the ideal that boards are the ultimate managers but
that their decisions should be informed. In the final analysis, the
provision of relevant information to the board, so long as its production
and assimilation is not so costly as to be counterproductive, is always a
good thing.

264. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
265. See id. (providing that the vote is advisory). There has not been a Delaware case striking
down executive compensation on the theory of excessiveness of amount. Where compensation have
been disapproved, the theory must be some showing of a breach of the duty of loyalty, including
bad faith, or corporate waste. See, e.g., Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(involving "spring-loaded" stock option grants in which options were granted immediate prior to
favorable press announcement); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357-58 (Del. Ch. 2007) (involving
back dating of stock option grants).
266. See supra Section II.A.
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D. Employee "Hold Up"
Another objection could be that employee monitoring would
create an employee "hold up" problem. If compensation would depend
in part on employee approval, the tacit understanding may be that a
CEO should keep employees happy even though this may undermine
firm profitability and shareholder value. 267 She could raise salaries of
employees because this would narrow the wage disparity ratio. Or, she
might not go ahead with needed layoffs because it would be unpopular.
Employee voting, perhaps in some organized fashion, could be used as
a coercive "hold up" device.
There is some merit to the "hold up" objection, though it
ultimately does not withstand closer scrutiny. 268 If employee approval
is a factor in pay decisions, CEOs may become more sensitive to the
approval of employees. With respect to the distribution of the
and
gains among management, shareholders,
corporation's
employees-the principal internal constituents having claims on
production gains-if employees get a little more than they do currently,
it should not be a cause for alarm. Minimum wage laws do precisely
this as between shareholders and employees, absent perfect passthrough to customers in the form of increased prices. It is true that a
newly formed device of corporate governance may create distributional
effects. Currently, executives get a large share of the gain from
production as compared to employees. 269 This raises an issue of equity
and fairness in the corporate enterprise. Laws often have such
distributional effects. Corporate law is not neutral to distributional

267. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 25, at 804-05 (suggesting that active employee
participation in corporate governance can "help hold management to the equitable treatment of
workers under long-term implicit deals").
268. See Bagchi, supra note 28, at 876 (noting that potential conflict exists between employees
and shareholders with respect to the distribution of wealth and imposition of costs).
269. See Mishel & Davis, supra note 4, at 3 & tbl.1 (indicating that CEO pay has greatly
outpaced the income of workers).
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2 72
27
effects. 270 There are many corporations in history ' and currently
that pay employees very well.
Any scenario of a "hold up" would be fluid and not subject to easy
or simplistic generalization. The "hold up" problem dominates if CEOs
are substantially captured by employees, such that there are significant
questions of efficiency. Large business decisions and strategies-such
as mergers, layoffs, strategic outsourcing, labor contracts, and the3
27
like-should be made only in the interest of the corporate enterprise.
A merger not consummated to protect employee interests may be just
as bad a merger as one consummated to increase the CEO's empire and
pay. But the risk of a dominant "hold up" is minimal because alliances,
interests, circumstances, and a multitude of factors make decisionmaking in the corporation fluid and not subject to a dominant factor.
Rank and file employees should not be given the controlling
block of votes; 2 74 management should control. By virtue of a pyramidal
corporate hierarchy, managerial employees constitute a minority in
numbers, but they would hold the controlling block of votes. They are
already higher paid than most employees in the firm. Thinking like a
manager means that managers are sensitive to the fact that wages and
salaries are reported as a firm's expenses. If a manager is responsible
for a particular profit and loss (P&L) or the financial performance of an
entire business unit or product line, her salary and bonus may depend
on the P&L, as is commonly seen in business practice. There would be

270. Many rules in corporation law and corporate financing affect distribution among
different corporate constituents. See, e.g., Orban v. Fields, Civ. A. No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at
* 10-11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) (ruling that board's hostile action to dilute common stockholder in
favor of preferred stockholder interests was legitimate); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v.
Pathe Comm'n Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (ruling
that fiduciary duty shifts to creditors when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency); Katz v.
Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 881-82 (Del. Ch. 1986) (ruling that bondholders have no recourse
when the corporation engages in a coercive exchange offer); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that bondholders have no
recourse for lost value when the corporation engages in a leverage buyout).
271. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919) (noting that Henry
Ford wanted "to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes"); HENRY FORD: MY
LIFE AND WORK: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HENRY FORD 116-30 (1922) (noting that Ford set a
minimum wage of five dollars per day, increased to six dollars, and that he believed in "paying
good wages").
272. Investment banks typically pay their employees very high wages, which have been
typically in the range of forty to fifty percent of net revenue. See supra note 156.
273. This is defined as the long-run value of the firm including the value of all securities.
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 236 (2002).
274. See supraSection II.B.
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a natural resistance to any unfettered or unprincipled attempt at a
wage "hold up."
In important transactions, the considerations and influencing
factors may be much greater than the isolated interplay between
management and employees. CEOs report to the board. They are
subject to market pressures such as stock price, activist shareholders,
and Wall Street. They are influenced by the market for corporate
control.2 75 Like other employees, they are influenced by concerns for
their professional reputations and the next job, which is the market
2 76
process of ex post "settling up."
Assume, for example, the CEO is forced to do the one thing that
will alienate employees the most-layoffs. As a result, disaffected
employees vote against the CEO's pay package, which is large because
the board felt it needed to incentivize a talented CEO and pay for her
opportunity costs. Two years have passed, and the drastic move turned
out to be the right one. The company was saved and is moving toward
financial health again. Would a board deciding on compensation be able
to put the negative employee vote in the context of the situation and
make an informed, independent judgment on the pay's merits? A
professional board, acting in an informed basis, would be able to
contextualize the negative vote by employees. One also suspects that in
the reporting process, the senior management, the only internal group
that has routine, direct access to the board, would duly explain why
employees are unhappy with management and why this unhappiness is
not correlated with the best interests of the corporation.
In the final analysis, employee "hold up" would be marginal on
the whole when the board and the management are confronted with a
multitude of complex factors in corporate decision-making. When there
is a fundamental conflict between the preference of employees and a
corporate action, employee "hold up" simply becomes a factor in
determining the effects of the action on the many stakeholders of a
corporation.

275. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112-14 (1965).
276. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
295-306 (1980) (suggesting that labor market should create proper incentives through "ex post
settling up"). But see Rhee, supra note 77, at 1176 (arguing that "the current problem of excessive
executive compensation calls into question whether this 'settling up' process is efficient, or even
works when the amount of compensation diminishes an executive's long-term incentives.").
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E. Political Objections
Another objection is political. The most visceral objection, and
perhaps an unspoken one at that, may come from a conviction that
employees, managers or not, have no place in opining on the pay
packages of senior executive officers. Some CEOs may be threatened by
the notion that employees would be evaluating them and approving
their pay packages, and some board members may dislike further
constraints and considerations imposed on their usually-unfettered
discretion to make business judgments. There may be strongly held
convictions on social, political, and class order among some in the elite
economic, business, and societal communities. Economists have long
recognized the influence of social and economic class on behavior,
attitudes, and consumption. 2 77 These strong objections can coalesce into
a concentrated political interest group, which would vigorously oppose
the idea of employee monitoring. Senior executive officers as a political
interest group have not warmly embraced the concept of shareholder
say-on-pay, 27 8 but the objection lost the political battle. The financial
crisis of 2008-2009 resulted in strong political support for corporate and
financial market reform. Shareholders' participation in corporate
governance is now firmly established in corporate law. On the other
hand, employee say-on-pay would run into strong political headwinds
since the principle of employee voting in corporate governance would be
perceived as novel. The political objection is relevant not on the merit
of the idea but as a pragmatic matter, even if some of the underlying
premises based on notions of class privilege are true, they would be
dubious and socially suspect.
However, politics is not always the death knell of sound reform.
The idea of employee monitoring is both pragmatic and politically
feasible. As with any major reform, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley or
Dodd-Frank Acts, a public perception of the necessity of reform drives
the legislative process. The idea of employee monitoring is legally and
economically sound in theory. One cannot predict the brew of political,
economic, and social circumstances that would overwhelm concentrated
political opposition. It could be that social inequity reaches a tipping
277.

See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899); see also

William Hildred, Executive Consumption: Not Conspicuous but Still Invidious, in THORSTEIN
VEBLEN IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A COMMEMORATION OF THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE

CLASS (1899-1999) 85-101 (Doug Brown ed., 1998).
278. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Dodd-Frank: Why FinancialReform
Tends to be Frustratedand Systemic Risk Perpetuated,97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1025 n.24 (2012)
(noting that corporate executives opposed say-on-pay); Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der
Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 659 (2015) (noting that shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8 for say on pay were opposed by corporate executives).
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point or another corporate or financial crisis occurs, galvanizing the
political forces needed for further reform.
Furthermore, the debate on executive pay is a global one.
Shareholder say-on-pay was first implemented in the U.K. and then
rapidly adopted in continental Europe and other common law countries,
including now the U.S.279 In other parts of the economically advanced
world, the role of employees and labor in corporate governance is more
prominent than in the U.S. and the relationship is more comfortable
and familiar. 28 0 It is conceivable that a formal role of employees as
compensation monitors may be adopted first in other parts of the world,
and then later imported into America as was the case with shareholder
say-on-pay. The legislative process is always difficult. The fact that sayon-pay as a corporate governance phenomenon has been so widely
adopted across advanced economies suggests that there are limits to the
political power of corporate executives. Despite opposition from
concentrated political interest groups, employee say-on-pay could be
politically feasible.
CONCLUSION

Few would dispute that in most companies the CEO should be
the highest paid employee, that they should be well compensated
compared to others for good performance, and that they should be
entitled to personal wealth after a successful tenure of value creation.
However, the extreme pay of a single senior employee in a corporation
raises the issue of corporate efficiency and income inequality, and these
issues spillover into the broad public and political discourse. The case
for employee monitoring is compelling. Employees can monitor senior
executive performance better than shareholders because they possess
inside information, and they have direct incentives to monitor.
Employee monitoring is feasible and cost effective. Employee input
leverages all of the information held in the corporation, and it can assist
the board in making an informed decision on executive pay. Employee
approval can also politically legitimize executive compensation in an
era in which executive pay and income inequality have touched the
public consciousness.
The benefits of employee monitoring outweigh the objections.
Concerns about information quality can be controlled through weighed
voting. Employee monitoring does not fundamentally shift the balance
of power in corporate governance. Legal power still resides with the
279. See supra Section I.C.
280. See supra note 263.
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board, but the board must now simply consider additional relevant
factors in making an informed decision. The interests of shareholders
and employees are not categorically inimical to each other. The use of
employee input can advance the interest of shareholders in insuring
that executive pay is tied to performance and does not reach grossly
excessive levels due to rent extraction through substantial control and
influence over the levers of corporate power that set compensation.

